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INTRODUCTION
In the process of creating the legal system underpinning
international trade in the aftermath of World War II, the
prevailing idea was a continuing liberalization of trade. This in
turn meant a closer integration of domestic economies.1 One
way to achieve these ends was what the Preamble to the 1947
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (“GATT”) terms the
process of “entering into reciprocal and mutually advantageous
arrangements directed to the substantial reduction of tariffs and
other barriers to trade.” 2 While the original GATT regime
contained rules that allowed for the justification of trade
barriers under particular circumstances, in Article XX of the
GATT, the increase in international trade3 prompted a number
of governments to create barriers other than tariffs or quotas to
protect the well-being of their populations, mostly from health
hazards or on environmental grounds. These new measures
coincided with an increased awareness of the risks that certain
products or production methods posed to human life or well-

1. For a variety of narratives, see Thomas J. Dillon, The World Trade Organization: A
New Legal Order for World Trade?, 16 MICH. J. INT’L L. 349, 351–52 (1995); Joost
Pauwelyn, The Transformation of World Trade, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1, 12–13 (2005); Daniel
Kalderimis, Problems of WTO Harmonization and the Virtues of Shields over Swords, 13 MINN.
J. GLOBAL TRADE 305, 306–07 (2004); ROBERT E. HUDEC, THE GATT LEGAL SYSTEM AND
WORLD TRADE DIPLOMACY 23 (Butterworth 2d ed., 1990) (1975); JOHN H. JACKSON,
WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT 2–3 (Bobbs-Merrill 1969).
2. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade pmbl., Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55
U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT].
3. RAYMOND J. AHEARN & IAN F. FERGUSSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41291,
WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION (WTO): ISSUES IN THE DEBATE ON CONTINUED U.S.
PARTICIPATION 3 (2010).
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being,4 therefore elevating the question of risk regulation to a
higher level of importance.
Depending on one’s point of view, these measures were
either instituted for legitimate reasons, that is for the protection
of human health or the environment, or they were considered
to be a second-generation barrier to legitimate international
trade.5 Thus, domestic regulation, starting in the 1960s, became
an ever-more important tool for domestic decision-makers. Over
time, regulation took on a more prominent role than the exact
tariff placed on a particular product in international
negotiations. At the same time, influential writings from legal
scholars and sociologists started to appear popularizing the
concept of “risk.”6 It was not until the Uruguay Round, however,
that negotiators finally came to an agreement on rules that
fleshed out the justifications laid down in the GATT in more
detail with respect to human, animal, or plant life or health,7

4. Note however that the public’s perception of risks and the scientific evidence
for risk may substantially diverge. See, e.g., Leslie Roberts, Counting on Science at EPA,
249 SCIENCE 616, 616 (1990). For an earlier article providing similar results across a
select number of societal subgroups, which shows deviations among them and between
scientists, see Paul Slovic, Perception of Risk, 236 SCIENCE 280, 281 (1987).
5. These differing viewpoints were reflected, for example, in the dispute over US
measures to protect marine life. See Larry A. DiMatteo et al., The Doha Declaration and
Beyond: Giving a Voice to Non-Trade Concerns within the WTO Trade Regime, 36 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 95, 99–100 (2003); Warren H. Maruyama, A New Pillar of the WTO: Sound
Science, 32 INT’L LAW. 651, 659–61 (1998). The Preamble of the Agreement on the
Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (“SPS Agreement”) is also
indicative in this regard: “Recognizing that developing country Members may
encounter special difficulties in complying with the sanitary or phytosanitary measures
of importing Members, and as a consequence in access to markets.” Agreement on the
Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures pmbl., Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1867 U.N.T.S. 493
[hereinafter SPS Agreement]. For further arguments on SPS measures, see generally
David G. Victor, The Sanitary and Phytosanitary Agreement of the World Trade Organization:
An Assessment after Five Years, 32 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 865 (2000).
6. Ulrich Beck, in his seminal work RISIKOGESELLSCHAFT, coined the term “risk
society,” and was one of the first authors to begin a larger public discourse about risk.
His book appeared in English as ULRICH BECK, RISK SOCIETY: TOWARDS A NEW
MODERNITY (Mark Ritter trans., Sage Publ’ns 1992) (1986); see also NIKLAS LUHMANN,
RISK: A SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY (Rhodes Barrett trans., 1993).
7. See SPS Agreement, supra note 5, pmbl.; Elizabeth Fisher, Beyond the
Science/Democracy Dichotomy: The World Trade Organization Sanitary and Phytosanitary
Agreement and Administrative Constitutionalism, in CONSTITUTIONALISM, MULTILEVEL
TRADE GOVERNANCE AND SOCIAL REGULATION 327, 328–29 (Christian Joerges & ErnstUlrich Petersmann eds., 2006).
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and international standardization more generally.8 The other
justifications remained to be fleshed out through the
jurisprudence of the previous working parties and the newlycreated—and considerably more powerful—dispute settlement
mechanism under the Dispute Settlement Understanding
(“DSU”).9
The Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and
Phytosanitary Measures (“SPS Agreement”) has gained
particular prominence in this regard since its inception in 1995.
This is evident through disputes concerning the permissibility of
using growth hormones in raising beef 10 or the use of
genetically-modified organisms in the production of food and
feed.11 While the SPS Agreement makes specific mention of the
role that science plays in ascertaining the existence of risk for
the establishment or maintenance of trade restricting measures,
such evidence is not unfamiliar to other parts of World Trade
Organization (“WTO”) law, especially in the environmental
field. While one could be excused for thinking that a sciencebased approach would lead to a decrease in substantive disputes
and a decline in arbitrary decision-making on the domestic level,
the track record since 1995 is mixed at best. Questions remain
about what constitutes scientific evidence, whether WTO
members can rely on a minority scientific opinion or have to
adhere to what is considered to be the majority scientific
opinion, whether non-scientific factors can play a role, and,
importantly, to what extent scientific questions that are not fully
researched or where only preliminary scientific evidence exists
can be taken into account. WTO dispute settlement organs have
therefore been tasked with interpreting terms such as “available
scientific evidence” or to determine whether a particular set of

8. Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade pmbl., Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1868 U.N.T.S. 120
[hereinafter TBT Agreement].
9. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes,
Apr. 14 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization,
Annex 2, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401 [hereinafter DSU].
10. Panel Report, EC–Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones),
WT/DS26/R/USA (Aug. 18, 1997) [hereinafter Panel Report, EC–Hormones].
11. Panel Report, EC-–Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing of Biotech
Products, WT/DS291/R, WT/DS292/R, WT/DS293/R (Sept. 29, 2006) [hereinafter
Panel Report, EC–Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products].
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information presents “insufficient evidence” for the
maintenance of a trade restrictive measure. Although most
adjudicators are not trained scientists, they find themselves
applying legal language and categorizations to complicated
scientific conclusions.
This Article attempts to understand the regulatory
philosophy that underlies the jurisprudence of the WTO in the
field of risk regulation in the context of the SPS Agreement.
While taking account of the interpretative methods of WTO
dispute settlement, the focus of this Article is on two separate
but interrelated aspects: First, Part I of this Article explains the
distinct languages and methodologies that science, on the one
hand, and law, on the other, use. After reviewing the treaty
language and the existing WTO jurisprudence in Part II, Part III
turns to the different methods or “transmission belts” that can
be used to translate scientific insights, or lack thereof, into legal
categories. Part IV makes the second substantive point by
analyzing the panels’ and the Appellate Body’s (“AB”)
underlying jurisprudential view of risk regulation. It
demonstrates that the approach taken by the panel level differs
considerably from that taken by the AB, thus making it more
difficult to find a coherent legal framework for these questions.
Finally, Part V provides a summary of the findings and draws
conclusions.
I. THE LANGUAGES OF SCIENCE AND LAW
The starting point for the present inquiry is the distinction
between the languages and methods that both science and law
use as a matter of course in their respective disciplines. While it
is natural that a particular discipline develops its own
approaches, methodology, and specific language to express
ideas and rationales, this development also leads to a dichotomy
of conversations when actors in one field (try to) communicate
with those from an unrelated discipline.12 As will be pointed out
in greater detail below, certain provisions of the SPS Agreement,
as well as other parts of WTO law, either explicitly or impliedly
mandate the use of scientific evidence in order to justify
12. See generally Robin Feldman, Historic Perspectives on Law & Science, 2009 STAN.
TECH. L. REV. 1 (discussing the law’s misunderstanding of science).
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domestic measures that limit or prohibit in their entirety the
importation of particular goods. Thus, not only the design of
the SPS Agreement, but also the increased awareness of risks to
either health or the environment in more general terms,
mandate a bridging of disciplines that employ different
languages and methodologies.
A. The Language of Science
Science has been described as being “progressive,”
employing “methods designed to approach a better
understanding over time.”13 The “object” of scientific inquiry is
“to figure out answers to questions about the world and how it
works.”14 This signifies an evolutionary methodology: knowledge
is acquired through a succession of inquiries, which ideally verify
a particular observation made or confirm a theoretical assertion.
In at least the majority of cases, this also means that having
found a particular answer, or in some cases, failure to do so, may
pave the way for additional questions that require additional
research.
Moreover, two interrelated aspects characterize scientific
investigation: it is by nature an open-ended inquiry process that
at least in theory must always be revisable.15 Under a different set
of circumstances there is at least a logical possibility that a
particular assertion could be falsified. Secondly, the tools and
techniques that are being used to gain a more thorough
understanding of a particular phenomenon are themselves
subject to change. This change may in turn yield a different
understanding, either because the results are more refined or
yield different conclusions altogether.
Importantly, there is no single “scientific method” that can
be followed in a formalized way and none that guarantees
additional insights.16 That in turn means that each field may
have their own discreet and distinct procedure that yields the
best results. For example, the differences between physics and
13. Douglas Crawford-Brown et al., Environmental Risk, Precaution, and Scientific
Rationality in the Context of WTO/NAFTA Trade Rules, 24 RISK ANALYSIS 461, 462 (2004).
14. Susan Haack, Irreconcilable Differences? The Troubled Marriage of Science and Law,
72 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 7 (2009).
15. See KARL R. POPPER, THE LOGIC OF SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERY 281 (1992).
16. Haack, supra note 14, at 8.
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biology are instructive. While the former has been called “a
breathtaking example of mathematical elegance combined with
fantastically accurate predictions,” the latter is characterized by
the central paradigm of evolution giving the field a higher
degree of complexity. 17 Because of this complexity “no one
seems to think that [the features of this complexity] can be
predicted in any detail on the basis of a deductive theory.”18
Over time, a particular field of science may thus attain a
common and shared understanding of the underpinnings of its
discipline. Such a consensus—be it one that supports an
assertion that was originally thought of as being invalid or be it
one that was originally embraced but which turned out to be
insupportable in the end—arises not by formal voting but only
as a byproduct when enough members of the relevant scientific
subcommunity come to regard the evidence as strong enough to
warrant this claim or that theory.”19 Note that already at this
stage, the idea that science is an objective or neutral arbiter of
disputes can be questioned. The very idea of a particular
hypothesis being accepted through members of a community is
itself a value-laden judgment.20
As will be laid out in greater detail below, science itself is
ideally policy-neutral. This is, of course, not to say that science is
not policy-relevant, but rather that scientific inquiry is
disinterested in the policy outcome that follows any revelation,
through publication or otherwise, of the results of the scientific
inquiry. All of this leads to conclusions that are stated in rather
cautious terms.21 Statements may thus be preceded by “there is
some evidence that” or “there is no acceptable evidence that.”22
17. Daniel A. Farber, Toward a New Legal Realism, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 279, 295
(2001).
18. Id.
19. Id. at 10. Or, as Paul Feyerabend writes, “[s]cience is an essentially anarchistic
enterprise.” PAUL FEYERABEND, AGAINST METHOD: OUTLINE OF AN ANARCHISTIC
THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE 17 (Verso 1978) (1975).
20. See THOMAS S. KUHN, THE ESSENTIAL TENSION: SELECTED STUDIES IN
SCIENTIFIC TRADITION AND CHANGE 320–39 (1977); Richard Rudner, The Scientist Qua
Scientist Makes Value Judgments, 20 PHIL. SCI. 1, 4 (1953).
21. Richard Wilson & E.A.C. Crouch, Risk Assessment and Comparisons: An
Introduction, 236 SCIENCE 267, 268 (1987).
22. STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE: TOWARD EFFECTIVE RISK
REGULATION 48 (1993); see also Ernan McMullin, Values in Science, in INTRODUCTORY
READINGS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE 515, 519–20 (E.D. Klemke et al. eds., 1998).
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This has led scientists to argue that in order to relay as full an
understanding as possible, risk may have to be expressed “in as
many different ways as possible.”23
B. The Language of Law
Law employs both a different language and a different
methodology. As expressed by Justice Blackmun in Daubert v.
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., “there are important
differences between the quest for truth in the courtroom and
the quest for truth in the laboratory. Scientific conclusions are
subject to perpetual revision. Law, on the other hand, must
resolve disputes finally and quickly.”24
This passage from Daubert summarizes some of the
differences between the worlds of science and law.25 Language is
one of the central elements for legal adjudication. It makes a
difference whether a sentence contains an “and” as opposed to
an “or;” it affects the outcome of a decision whether a text
contains the indefinite article “a” or the definite article “the.”26
The legal process also has a different objective: the
resolution of a particular conflict between two or more parties at
a particular moment in time. Unlike science, a plethora of rules
exist to guide the procedure in adjudicatory processes—for
example, the exclusion of potentially relevant evidence, which
of the parties carries the burden of proof, and how much time a
party has to establish an assertion made.27 By definition and due
to their forthcoming, these rules are themselves value-laden.
Sometimes they are extrinsic, having nothing at all to do with a
neutral inquiry into the truth. An example in the realm of
criminal law is the exclusion of evidence that was acquired
23. Wilson & Crouch, supra note 21, at 270.
24. 509 U.S. 579, 596–97 (1993).
25. Note that WTO law differs in important respects in that it does not possess the
strict binary nature of cases such as Daubert. Panel and AB decisions are often
characterized by including wide-ranging policy decisions and thus far larger
implications than for the immediate case to be decided.
26. One of the more famous examples in public international law is the debate
surrounding a resolution by the United Nations Security Council concerning the
situation in Israel. See generally LORD CARADON ET AL., U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL
RESOLUTION 242, A CASE STUDY IN DIPLOMATIC AMBIGUITY 22, 46 (1981); SYDNEY D.
BAILEY, THE MAKING OF RESOLUTION 242 at 152–58 (1985).
27. Crawford-Brown et al., supra note 13, at 462; Haack, supra note 14, at 13.
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improperly, such as if the prosecution were to obtain evidence
in an unlawful manner or withhold evidence from the defense.
The role of the lawyer, having to act in the best interest of
the client, is in almost complete contradistinction to that of a
disinterested scientist. If the latter is an inquirer, starting out
with a question to answer, the former is an advocate, trying to
persuade the adjudicator of a particular position and trying to
provide as many arguments in support thereof as possible. While
the role of a judge is by design more neutral, a judge still
operates in an environment where the search for truth is—often
for good reasons—constrained. The character of adversarial
judicial proceedings in which the parties furnish the experts
implies the use of scientific experts who may express more
certainty than the scientific underpinnings would allow. This
means that looking at expert testimony on a spectrum, with the
representatives on the outer bounds claiming certainty for their
own—often
mutually
contradictory—opinions,
genuine
scientific debate tends to happen in the center where certainty is
muted, positions not fully contradictory and representatives at
least open to accepting another fellow scientist’s assessment.28
Court proceedings—and this is especially true in the case of
the WTO29—are characterized by time limits that emphasize the
resolution of the conflict at hand within a reasonable period.
Moreover, legal decisions are considered to be definitive—at
least once all options for appeals have been exhausted. An
individual decision thus has an inherent element of finality, one
that—very much unlike the scientific process—does not evolve
or change over time.30

28. For an analysis of how the adversarial legal system has a tendency to make
experts appear to be certain about scientifically contestable findings, see Haack, supra
note 14, at 16.
29. PETER VAN DEN BOSSCHE, THE LAW AND POLICY OF THE WORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATION: TEXT, CASES AND MATERIALS 200, 287–88 (2d ed. 2008). Under the
Dispute Settlement Understanding (“DSU”) rules, panel proceedings are to be
finished in less than nine months, Appellate Body (“AB”) proceedings are not to last
longer than ninety days. Both timeframes are regularly exceeded. See id.; Timing of
Appeal, Circulation and Adoption of Appellate Body Reports, WORLDTRADELAW.NET,
http://www.worldtradelaw.net/dsc/database/abtiming.asp (last visited Sept. 12, 2011).
30. The finality of a particular dispute stands in contrast to the evolving long-term
development of legal doctrines and which, depending on the legal sysem, can have a
considerable impact on subsequent decision-making. Such an evolution may respond
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C. The Significance of the Debate
The relevance of this disparity becomes evident in
situations where a scientific expert is called to testify before a
body tasked with making decisions based on legal rules.
Challenges arise in a variety of circumstances.
Questions posed by an adjudicator may be based on legal
logic and may lack an understanding of how the scientific
process works. This became evident in the panel proceedings in
United States–Continued Suspension of Obligations in the EC–
Hormones Dispute (“US–Continued Suspension”). 31 At numerous
points in the hearing, the panel members indicate their
unfamiliarity with the scientific process. For example, one of the
panelists asked: “I take it then that the answer is there is no new
scientific information that would fundamentally change what
was already analysed in the 1999 review.” 32 The expert’s
response pointed out that he could not answer that question
with a sufficient degree of certainty,33 and was again pressed by
another panelist on that point.34 It is imperative that panelists
understand the process of scientific experimentation and what
weight is to be given to empirical data in the face of uncertainty
about the explanatory effect of a particular theory. Scientists, on
the other hand, may understand a question concerned with
legal categorization on purely scientific terms, therefore leaving
out information that would otherwise be considered important.
A statement by an expert to the effect that she or he cannot
attest to whether a particular substance or a process is
dangerous or whether a particular outcome is solely based on
the introduction of one particular substance could be
interpreted ambiguously. Even a statement such as “I do not
know” may have a different meaning. It may simply imply that
there is not enough information—the appropriate response to
which is most likely not to ignore something simply because it is
to changing societal attitudes or scientific insights as well as the introduction of new
methods of evidence gathering.
31. See generally Panel Report, United States–Continued Suspension of Obligations in the
EC–Hormones Dispute, WT/DS320/R (Mar. 31, 2008) [hereinafter Panel Report, US–
Continued Suspension].
32. Id., Annex G, ¶ 656.
33. Id. ¶ 662.
34. Id. ¶ 663.
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not a proven hazard.35 For a scientist, his or her statement would
necessarily be understood to have validity only under the
conditions under which the particular experiment was
conducted. This means that scientific testimony is rarely
unqualified, but rather inherently limited. The language of law,
on the other hand, is absolute and usually employs a binary
decision-making process because something must be considered
to be either legal or illegal. Individuals being tasked with making
legal decisions are therefore put into a position to ascertain the
language of scientists and translate it into one of the two legal
categories. One can arguably claim that, for example, the
principle of proportionality or the requirement to take
extenuating circumstances into account in criminal proceedings
can ameliorate inequitable or wholly unfair outcomes. But even
before reaching that particular stage in the decision-making
process, the different languages may have already paved the way
for a legal conclusion to which a scientist may not have
imagined a particular statement could lead.36
An additional challenge presents itself in situations in
which scientists differ as to the conclusions to be drawn from a
particular set of scientific data. As was true in all decisions in the
WTO context concerning the use of scientific evidence, the
opposing parties to the dispute presented expert testimony as to
the viability of their respective positions.37 In such situations,
35. See Wilson & Crouch, supra note 21, at 267–68.
36 . This is not to say that legal decisions are never complex. Oftentimes,
adjudicatory processes take a long time and complicated issues must be resolved. This
may be gleaned, in the context of WTO law, from the increasing time it takes to reach a
decision at both the panel and the AB stage. For a detailed account of the timing
involved at the AB stage, see Timing of Appeal, Circulation and Adoption of Appellate Body
Reports, supra note 29. No matter how complex a particular decision-making process
may have been, however, the ultimate decision a court makes is of a binary nature.
37. See Panel Report, Australia–Measures Affecting Importation of Salmon,
WT/DS18/R (June 12, 1998) [hereinafter Panel Report, Australia–Salmon]; Panel
Report, EC–Hormones, supra note 10; Panel Report, EC Measures Concerning Meat and
Meat Products (Hormones), WT/DS48/R/CAN (Aug. 18, 1997) [hereinafter Panel
Report, EC–Hormones (Canada)]; Panel Report, Japan–Measures Affecting Agricultural
Products, WT/DS76/R (Oct. 27, 1998) [hereinafter Panel Report, Japan–Agricultural
Products II]; Panel Report, Japan–Measures Affecting the Importation of Apples,
WT/DS245/R (July 15, 2003) [hereinafter Panel Report, Japan–Apples]; Panel Report,
EC–Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products, supra note 11; Panel Report, US–
Continued Suspension, supra note 31. The relevant AB reports are Appellate Body
Report, Australia–Measures Affecting Importation of Salmon, WT/DS18/AB/R, (Oct. 20,
1998) [hereinafter Appellate Body Report, Australia–Salmon]; Appellate Body Report,
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scientific experts may disagree on the facts underlying the case
or may have differing views as to the certainty of particular
statements in light of the evidence that they or others could
find. They may also differ as to how much weight to give factors
such as direct empirical evidence, semi-empirical evidence,
empirical correlation, theory-based inference, or even existential
insight.38 An adjudicator may end up in the unenviable position
of nevertheless having to make a finding as to the legality of a
particular trade measure without being able to rely on a
sufficient amount of certainty.
A statement by a scientist as to the inability to attest to the
toxicity of a certain substance may thus be understood by a nonscientist WTO member as operating “without sufficient
evidence.” As will be seen in the next section, such a lack of
understanding of the scientific process can have a significant
impact on, and in some instances can determine, the outcome
of cases in WTO proceedings.
An additional element complicates matters in cases before
the WTO dispute settlement organs. As has been pointed out
numerous times, the AB has employed a textual approach to
interpreting WTO treaty language. 39 Ostensibly based on
European Communities–Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones),
WT/DS26/AB/R & WT/DS48/AB/R (Jan. 16, 1998) [hereinafter Appellate Body
Report, EC–Hormones]; Appellate Body Report, Japan–Measures Affecting Agricultural
Products, WT/DS76/AB/R (Feb. 22, 1999) [hereinafter Appellate Body Report, Japan–
Agricultural Products II]; Appellate Body Report, Japan–Measures Affecting the Importation
of Apples, WT/DS245/AB/R (Nov. 26, 2003) [hereinafter Appellate Body Report,
Japan–Apples]; Appellate Body Report, United States–Continued Suspension of Obligations in
the EC–Hormones Dispute, WT/DS320/AB/R (Oct. 16, 2008) [hereinafter Appellate
Body Report, US–Continued Suspension].
38. Crawford-Brown et al., supra note 13, at 465. Arguably, at least, the last
element, which is “rooted in a purely subjective judgment of risk,” is no longer part of
a strict scientific process, but rather a conclusory aspect as to how to manage a risk that
has been identified. Id. For more detail, see DOUGLAS J. CRAWFORD-BROWN, RISK-BASED
ENVIRONMENTAL DECISIONS: CULTURE AND METHODS 52–53 (1999).
39. See, e.g., David Palmeter & Petros C. Mavroidis, The WTO Legal System: Sources of
Law, 92 AM. J. INT’L L. 398, 398 (1998); Bryan Mercurio & Mitali Tyagi, Treaty
Interpretation in WTO Dispute Settlement: The Outstanding Question of the Legality of Local
Working Requirements, 19 MINN. J. INT’L L. 275, 302 (2010); Claus-Dieter Ehlermann, Six
Years on the Bench of the “World Trade Court:” Some Personal Experiences as Member of the
Appellate Body of the World Trade Organization, 36 J. WORLD TRADE 605, 616 (2002);
Federico Ortino, Treaty Interpretation and the WTO Appellate Body Report in US-Gambling:
A Critique, 9 J. INT’L ECON. L. 117, 122–24 (2006); Michael Lennard, Navigating by the
Stars: Interpreting the WTO Agreements, 5 J. INT’L ECON. L. 17, 87 (2002).
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Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties40
and, arguably more importantly, out of concern for the
legitimacy of the WTO dispute settlement process in its infant
stage,41 the AB’s interpretation has been characterized by an
explicit reliance on dictionaries for definitional purposes and by
avoiding other means of interpretation as much as possible. It
thus stands in marked contrast to other judicial institutions on
the international plane, most of all the jurisprudential approach
of the Court of Justice of the European Union.42 It has been
argued that this approach is nothing but a mask or a “pretense”
and that “any critical reading of the case law will show that when
it appears fit the AB is no less teleological, contextual, or
systematic than any other tribunal of similar standing.”43 The
problem then is that (overly) strong reliance on a textual
approach comes at the expense of “the richer contextual matrix
of its decisions”44 and potentially an inability to take account of
the wider background before which science operates.
II. WTO LAW AND RISK SCIENCE: THE SPS AGREEMENT
The SPS Agreement 45 —under which members are
permitted to take measures to protect, within their own

40. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31, May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331.
41. For more information on sources of legitimacy of the WTO dispute settlement
process, see Yuka Fukunaga, Civil Society and the Legitimacy of the WTO Dispute Settlement
System, 34 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 85, 111–12 (2008).
42. See Ehlermann, supra note 39, at 616.
43. Henrik Horn & Joseph H.H. Weiler, European Communities—Trade Description
of Sardines: Textualism and Its Discontent, in THE WTO CASE LAW OF 2002 248, 252
(Henrik Horn & Petros C. Mavroidis eds., 2005).
44. Id. at 255.
45 . This section outlines the pertinent legal issues with regard to the SPS
Agreement. Other agreements contained in the annexes to the WTO Agreement face
similar challenges, notably the questions dealt with in this section also appear in the
jurisprudence of Article XX of the GATT. Furthermore, similar questions pertaining to
the assessment of risk to the economy of a WTO member (and therefore not human,
animal, or plant life or health) also arise in the context of the Agreement on
Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994,
Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization,
Annex 1A, 1868 U.N.T.S 201, as well as the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing
Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, Annex 1A, 1867 U.N.T.S. 14. These may necessitate a different approach
when dealing with such risks.
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territory, the life and health of humans, animals, and plants
from, inter alia, pests, diseases, additives, and contaminants—
employs a science-based approach for the invocation of traderestricting measures.46
The SPS Agreement explicitly mandates that measures
instituted by WTO members be “based on scientific principles”
and that they are “not maintained without sufficient scientific
evidence.” 47 Members are strongly encouraged to follow
international standards in developing internal measures.48 The
use of such standards creates a presumption of compliance with
the terms of the SPS Agreement, and any deviation must be
specifically justified on the part of the country opting for a
higher level of protection than that set forth in the international
standard.49 Thus, the SPS Agreement allows for a deviation from
international standards, provided that there is “a scientific
justification” and provided that the additional requirements
under Article 5 of the SPS Agreement are met. 50 These
requirements include carrying out a risk assessment,51 in the
process of which members “shall take into account available
scientific evidence.”52 Provisional measures may be taken “where
relevant scientific evidence is insufficient,” but “[m]embers shall
seek to obtain the additional information necessary for a more
objective assessment of risk . . . within a reasonable period of
time.”53
A. Scientific Justification
Given the overarching ideal of the WTO, laid down, for
example, as the “elimination of discriminatory treatment,”54 it is
46. See SPS Agreement, supra note 5, Annex A, ¶ 1, for the definition of an SPS
measure.
47. Id. art. 2.2.
48. See, e.g., id. art. 3 .
49. See id. art. 3.3.
50. See, e.g., Appellate Body Report, Australia–Salmon, supra note 37, ¶¶ 237–45,
(discussing the need for “scientific evidence” and a risk assessment meeting Article 5’s
requirements).
51. SPS Agreement, supra note 5, art. 5.1.
52. Id. art. 5.2.
53. Id. art. 5.7.
54. See Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization pmbl. 3,
Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154. Similar language can be found in the Preamble of
the SPS Agreement. See SPS Agreement, supra note 5, pmbl. (requiring that measures
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not surprising that SPS measures must be taken on a rational
basis. While Article 2.1 of the SPS Agreement allows WTO
members to take SPS measures, Article 2.2 SPS Agreement
mandates that this be done with a considerable amount of
scrutiny. It sets a limit on the breadth of the measure (“only to
the extent necessary”) including a proportionality requirement
and requires that any measure be based on “scientific principles
and . . . not maintained without sufficient scientific evidence.” 55
While the case law has clarified the provision to some extent, the
exact relationship between Article 2.2 and Article 5.1 is still not
clear.56 In its case law, the AB pointed out that the two provisions
should be read in conjunction with one another, as Article 5.1
was found to be a “specific application of the basic obligations
contained in Article 2.2.”57
What emerges from the case law is the following: the term
“scientific evidence” was interpreted, relying on dictionary
definitions, as meaning “‘of, relating to, or used in science,’
‘broadly, having or appearing to have an exact, objective,
factual, systematic or methodological basis,’ ‘of, relating to, or
exhibiting the methods or principles of science’ and ‘of,
pertaining to, using, or based on the methodology of science.’”58
While these definitions are not necessarily satisfactory, the more
problematic element of the term is the word “sufficient.” 59
According to the AB, the term implies a “relational concept”
and requires “the existence of a sufficient or adequate
relationship . . . between the SPS measure and the scientific
evidence.”60 In a subsequent case, the AB attempted to clarify
this finding by stating that the relationship needs to be “rational
not be “applied in a manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or
unjustifiable discrimination”).
55. See SPS Agreement, supra note 5, arts. 2.1, 2.2; Anja Seibert-Fohr, Article 2 SPS,
in 3 MAX PLANCK COMMENTARIES ON WORLD TRADE LAW: WTO-TECHNICAL BARRIERS
AND SPS MEASURES ¶¶ 12, 17–18 (Rüdiger Wolfrum et al. eds., 2007).
56. See Lukasz Gruszczynski, Science in the Process of Risk Regulation under the WTO
Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, 7 GER. L.J. 371, 375–77 (2006).
57. Appellate Body Report, EC–Hormones, supra note 37, ¶ 180. This ruling was
confirmed in Appellate Body Report, Japan–Agricultural Products II, supra note 37, ¶ 82.
58. Appellate Body Report, EC–Hormones, supra note 37, ¶ 187, ¶ 187 n.172.
59 . See SPS Agreement, supra note 5, art. 2.2 (“[N]ot maintained without
sufficient scientific evidence . . . .”); SPS Agreement, supra note 5, art. 5.7 (“In cases
where relevant scientific evidence is insufficient . . . .”).
60. Appellate Body Report, Japan– Apples, supra note 37, ¶ 73.

166 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 35:151
or objective,” requiring verifiable data to support the
conclusions arrived at, 61 which, in turn, requires at least a
“certain level of objectivity.” 62 Without prejudice to the
precautionary principle contained in Article 5.7 of the SPS
Agreement, this would imply that the more trade-restrictive a
measure is, the higher the evidentiary threshold. On the other
hand, the AB went to great lengths to point out that even at this
stage of the process, panels should take account of the fact that
“responsible, representative governments commonly act from
perspectives of prudence and precaution where risks of
irreversible, e.g. life-terminating, damage to human health are
concerned.”63
B. Higher Level of Protection Requires Scientific Justification
The SPS Agreement presumes that a country is in
compliance with its disciplines if a member’s measures are
“based on the relevant international standards, guidelines or
recommendations.” 64 It therefore seeks to harmonize the
application of domestic SPS measures with international
standards.65 These standards, guidelines, and recommendations
are not elaborated on by the WTO, but rather, Annex A(3) of
the SPS Agreement refers to specific organizations in their
respective fields. 66 At the same time, the SPS Agreement
recognizes—at least on its face—regulatory autonomy for WTO
61. Id. ¶ 114.
62. Panel Report, Australia–Salmon, supra note 37, ¶ 7.48.
63. Appellate Body Report, EC–Hormones, supra note 37, ¶ 124.
64. SPS Agreement, supra note 5, art. 3.3.
65. See Terence P. Stewart & David S. Johanson, The SPS Agreement of the World
Trade Organization and the International Trade of Dairy Products, 54 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 55,
57 (1999); Victor, supra note 5, at 875.
66. The relevant organizations are:
[F]or food safety, the standards, guidelines and recommendations established
by the Codex Alimentarius Commission relating to food additives, veterinary
drug and pesticide residues, contaminants, methods of analysis and sampling,
and codes and guidelines of hygienic practice; for animal health and
zoonoses, the standards, guidelines and recommendations developed under
the auspices of the International Office of Epizootics; for plant health, the
international standards, guidelines and recommendations developed under
the auspices of the Secretariat of the International Plant Protection
Convention in cooperation with regional organizations operating within the
framework of the International Plant Protection Convention . . . .
SPS Agreement, supra note 5, Annex A ¶ 3(a)–(c).
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members: the agreement allows members to impose measures
that result in a higher level of SPS protection, under the
condition that the member provides a scientific justification for
the deviation or its measure comports with the strictures of
Article 5.67
The early case law left uncertainties over whether Article
3.3 allowed for these two alternatives.68 The more permissive
interpretation would have allowed members significantly more
decisional autonomy and would have alleviated the members
from the rather onerous requirements under Article 5. This
uncertainty was criticized by the AB in EC–Measures Concerning
Meat and Meat Products (Hormones) (“EC-Hormones”) when it said
that “Article 3.3 is evidently not a model of clarity in drafting
and communication.”69 The AB provided that clarity in the same
decision by eviscerating the provision of all independent
meaning. The disjunctive “or” was effectively turned into a
conjunctive “and.”70 It based its decision on the last sentence of
Article 3.3, which provides that higher levels of SPS protection
“shall not be inconsistent with any other provision of this
Agreement,” as well as the text of the footnote in the official text
which was held to essentially embody the requirements of Article
5 of the SPS Agreement.71
C. Dealing with Risk
Scientific evidence is therefore the lynchpin of compliance
with the SPS Agreement should a WTO member decide to
deviate from the international standard in a particular area. It
must then carry out a risk assessment under Articles 5.1–5.3, the
intensity of which depends on what type of measure is at issue.
Early panel decisions 72 and some commentators 73
distinguish between two stages in the process of how to deal with
67. See SPS Agreement, supra note 5, art. 3.3.
68. See Appellate Body Report, EC–Hormones, supra note 37, ¶ 175.
69. See id. ¶ 175.
70. See id. ¶¶ 175, 177.
71. See id. ¶ 175; SPS Agreement, supra note 5, art. 3.3.
72. See, e.g., Panel Report, EC–Hormones (Canada), supra note 37, ¶¶ 8.94–8.98;
Panel Report, EC–Hormones, supra note 37, ¶¶ 8.91–8.95.
73. See VAN DEN BOSSCHE, supra note 29, at 852–62; Jeremy D. Fraiberg & Michael
J. Trebilcock, Risk Regulation: Technocratic and Democratic Tools for Regulatory Reform, 43
MCGILL L.J. 835, 849 (1998); Christian Joerges, Law, Science and the Management of Risks
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risk by separating the risk assessment from risk management.
This distinction existed in domestic mechanisms, for example in
the United States, well before it appeared in WTO
jurisprudence. 74 In the US context, the former is—in an
idealized form—understood to mean a “characterization of the
potential adverse health effects of human exposures to
environmental hazards.”75 Risk management is the second step
and means a “process of identifying, evaluating, selecting, and
implementing actions to reduce risk to human health and to
ecosystems. The goal of risk management is to create
scientifically sound, cost-effective, integrated actions that reduce
or prevent risks while taking into account social, cultural,
ethical, political, and legal considerations.”76
The same approach was taken by the Panel in response to
the US and Canadian complaints in EC–Hormones, which drew a
distinction between the two phases of risk assessment and risk
management,77 a move roundly rejected by the AB. The Panel
drew what it saw as a clear distinction between the two stages.
Risk assessment, defined as “a scientific examination of data and
factual studies,” is unlike risk management because it is “not a
policy exercise involving social value judgments made by
political bodies.” 78 Risk management “involves social value
to Health at the National, European and International Level—Stories on Baby Dummies, Mad
Cows and Hormones in Beef, 7 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 1, 15 (2001); Vern R. Walker, Keeping the
WTO from Becoming the “World Trans-Science Organization”: Scientific Uncertainty, Science
Policy, and Factfinding in the Growth Hormones Dispute, 31 CORNELL INT’L. L.J. 251, 255,
267–77 (1998).
74. See, e.g., COMM. ON THE INSTITUTIONAL MEANS FOR ASSESSMENT OF RISKS TO
PUB. HEALTH, NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, RISK ASSESSMENT IN THE FEDERAL
GOVERNMENT: MANAGING THE PROCESS 18–19 (1983). Note however that the
Committee was aware that its separation between risk assessment and risk management
could be undermined by policy considerations. See id. at 33–37; see also BREYER, supra
note 22, at 9; WILLIAM W. LOWRANCE, OF ACCEPTABLE RISK: SCIENCE AND THE
DETERMINATION OF SAFETY 8 (1976).
75. COMM. ON THE INSTITUTIONAL MEANS FOR ASSESSMENT OF RISKS TO PUB.
HEALTH, supra note 74, at 18. The document points out that this definition has not
been universally accepted, with critics contending that risk assessment should only take
account of quantitative elements as opposed to qualitative factors. Id.
76 . 1 PRESIDENTIAL/CONG. COMM’N ON RISK ASSESSMENT AND RISK MGMT.,
FRAMEWORK FOR ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH RISK MANAGEMENT 1 (1997).
77. See Panel Report, EC–Hormones (Canada), supra note 37, ¶¶ 8.94–8.100; Panel
Report, EC–Hormones, supra note 10, ¶¶ 8.91–8.160.
78. Panel Report, EC–Hormones (Canada), supra note 37, ¶¶ 8.97, 8.163; Panel
Report, EC–Hormones, supra note 10, ¶¶ 8.94, 8.160.
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judgments” such that “[o]nce the risks have been assessed, i.e.,
once the risks and their probability of occurrence [are]
identified, a Member will need to decide, on the basis of its own
value judgments, whether it can accept these risks.”79 The AB,
however, rejected this understanding on two grounds: 1) it
found no basis in Article 5 of the SPS Agreement, nor in any
other provision, for this distinction;80 2) it understood Article
5.2, which indicates factors to be taken into account in assessing
the risk, to be an open-ended list.81 Its approach recognized, as
mentioned above, that the measures contemplated by members
did not take place in a laboratory, but rather in “human
societies as they actually exist, in other words, the actual
potential for adverse effects on human health in the real world
where people live and work and die.”82 This interpretation itself
is not free from criticism. While it broadened the scope of
factors that may be taken into consideration and allowed for a
more holistic approach, it also deviated from the language of
Article 2.2, which provides context to Articles 5.1 through 5.3,83
and which demands that SPS measures be based on “sufficient
scientific evidence.”84
Whether this means that non-scientific factors, including
cultural or subjective factors that shape the perceptions of risk,
can be taken into account in the decision-making process
leading up to the institution of the measure85 was not addressed
79. Id.
80. Appellate Body Report, EC–Hormones, supra note 37, ¶ 181.
81. Id. ¶ 187; see also Reinhard Quick & Andreas Blüthner, Has the Appellate Body
Erred?: An Appraisal and Criticism of the Ruling in the WTO Hormones Case, 2 J. INT’L
ECON. L. 603, 617–18 (1999).
82. Appellate Body Report, EC–Hormones, supra note 37, ¶ 187.
83. See, e.g., Appellate Body Report, US–Continued Suspension, supra note 37, ¶ 526.
84. Quick & Blüthner, supra note 81, at 617–19. The authors suspect that one of
the AB’s motives for this move was to make the ruling “politically acceptable.” Id. at
618.
85. See, e.g., Alessandra Arcuri, Food Safety at the WTO after ‘Continued
Suspension’: A Paradigm Shift?, in THE EUROPEAN UNION AND GLOBAL EMERGENCIES: A
LAW AND POLICY ANALYSIS 205, 208–12 (Antonis Antoniadis et al. eds., 2011); M. Gregg
Bloche, WTO Deference to National Health Policy: Toward an Interpretive Principle, 5 J. INT’L
ECON. L. 825, 836 (2002); Caroline E. Foster, Public Opinion and the Interpretation of the
World Trade Organisation’s Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, J. INT’L
ECON. L. 427, 427 (2008); Vern R. Walker, The Myth of Science as a ‘‘Neutral Arbiter’’ for
Triggering Precautions, 26 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 197, 198 (2003); David Winickoff
et al., Adjudicating the GM Food Wars: Science, Risk, and Democracy in World Trade Law, 30
YALE J. INT’L L. 81, 85 (2005); TRACEY EPPS, INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND HEALTH

170 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 35:151
by the AB in its rulings and remains an open question. The track
record following the AB’s decision in EC–Hormones indicates a
cautious openness to undeterminable scientific factors, although
scientific evidence has played—by far—the greater role.86 The
AB’s ruling does however take account of the fact that the
idealized and almost sterile version of science that the Panel—
somewhat naively—promoted was neither commensurate with
the realities of scientific exploration in which non-scientific
factors do play a role,87 nor the requirements of deliberative
democratic forms of governance,88 nor did it appear cognizant
of the complex interplay between various factors that create risks
outside of the laboratory setting.
1. Risk Assessment Stage
The AB’s understanding of risk assessment as “a process
characterized by systematic, disciplined and objective inquiry
and analysis, that is, a mode of studying and sorting out facts
and opinions” had been established since the original EC–
Hormones dispute89 and had been confirmed by the AB in United
States–Continued Suspension of Obligations in the EC–Hormones
Dispute (“US–Continued Suspension”). 90 As laid out in the AB
report in Australia–Measures Affecting Importation of Salmon,91 the
SPS Agreement distinguishes between two types of measures: socalled quarantine risk, that is, “the likelihood of entry,
PROTECTION: A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT OF THE WTO’S SPS AGREEMENT (Cheltenham:
Edward Elgar, 2008). It is arguable that, as Bloche claims, there is only a “low empirical
barrier” to be crossed. Rather, the AB’s jurisprudence in Appellate Body Report, EC–
Hormones allows deference to domestic decision-making once substantial empirical
barriers are overcome. Bloche, supra, at 837.
86. See Seibert-Fohr, supra note 55, ¶ 27; Marcos A. Orellana, Evolving WTO Law
Concerning Health, Safety and Environmental Measures, 1 TRADE, L. & DEV. 103, 122–26
(2009).
87. See, e.g., Appellate Body Report, US–Continued Suspension, supra note 37,
¶ 480–82 (finding relevant the institution in which an expert works and the possible
effects thereof on the expert’s impartiality).
88. See Robert Howse, Democracy, Science, and Free Trade: Risk Regulation on Trial at
the World Trade Organization, 98 MICH. L. REV. 2329, 2343 (2000); Jacqueline Peel, Risk
Regulation Under the WTO SPS Agreement: Science as an International Normative Yardstick?
90 (N.Y. Univ. Sch. of Law, Jean Monnet Working Paper, Working Paper No. 02/04,
2004), available at http://centers.law.nyu.edu/jeanmonnet/papers/04/040201.pdf.
89. See Appellate Body Report, EC–Hormones, supra note 37, ¶ 187.
90. See Appellate Body Report, US–Continued Suspension, supra note 37, ¶ 527.
91. See Appellate Body Report, Australia–Salmon, supra note 37, ¶¶ 120–21.
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establishment or spread of a pest or disease within the territory
of an importing Member,”92 and so-called food-borne risks, that
is, the “potential for adverse effects on human or animal health
arising from the presence of additives, contaminants, toxins or
disease-causing organisms in food, beverages or feedstuffs.”93
The AB was careful to point out the distinction between the
“likelihood of entry” on the one hand and the “potential for
adverse effects,” the former mandating a higher degree of
certainty in that there must not only exist some abstract
possibility of entry, establishment, or spread of diseases and
associated biological and economic consequences, but also the
assessment must—in either qualitative or quantitative terms94—
show the probability thereof.95 That being said, the AB has long
held that this does not require meeting a particular “magnitude
or threshold level of risk.”96
The methods of risk assessment are outlined in Article 5.2
and have been considerably supplemented by subsequent
jurisprudence. As pointed out above, the AB declared early on
that Article 5.2 does not represent a closed list, but rather that
WTO members have a certain amount of discretion in choosing
the methods for determining the risk that they have identified.97
The AB has repeatedly reiterated this position since then,
including in its latest report concerning the SPS Agreement.98
Members also have discretion as to the so-called threshold level
of risk that they are willing to accept before instituting their
measures. 99 This recognized the need for domestic decisionmakers to make decisions for which they could subsequently be
held accountable.

92 . SPS Agreement, supra note 5, Annex A, ¶ 4; see LUKASZ GRUSCZYNSKI,
REGULATING HEALTH AND ENVIRONMENTAL RISKS UNDER WTO LAW 116 (2010).
93. Appellate Body Report, Australia–Salmon, supra note 37, ¶8.36; SPS
Agreement, supra note 5, Annex A, ¶ 4.
94 . Appellate Body Report, Australia–Salmon, supra note 37, ¶ 124; see also
Appellate Body Report, EC–Hormones, supra note 37, ¶ 187.
95. See Appellate Body Report, Australia–Salmon, supra note 37, ¶ 123.
96. See Appellate Body Report, EC–Hormones, supra note 37, ¶ 186.
97. See id. ¶ 187.
98. See Appellate Body Report, Australia–Salmon, supra note 37, ¶¶ 207-08.
99. See Appellate Body Report, Australia–Salmon, supra note 37, ¶ 125; Appellate
Body Report, EC–Hormones, supra note 37, ¶ 124.
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Despite later rulings on the panel stage to the contrary,100
the AB has remained unambiguous regarding the nature of the
inquiry a panel is supposed to perform: it does not exist to
review the measures of WTO members de novo and therefore
judge the substantive merits of an SPS measure; nor is its role to
be fully deferential. 101 A panel does not—and the panel
proceedings in US–Continued Suspension confirms this—have the
required expertise to fulfill this role. Nor would its adjudicatory
function be fulfilled if its review was fully deferential. Rather, its
function is to conduct—in line with Article 11 of the DSU—an
“objective assessment of the facts,” meaning to “determine
whether [the] risk assessment is supported by coherent
reasoning and respectable scientific evidence.” 102 This means
that minority viewpoints in science are valid bases for
determining the existence of risk, as long as they possess the
“necessary scientific and methodological rigour to be
considered reputable science.” 103 Importantly for present
purposes, the AB’s analysis in US–Continued Suspension makes
direct reference to the peer review mechanism outlined above:
such minority views “must be considered to be legitimate science
according to the standards of the relevant scientific
community.”104
This then outlines the task of a panel. In light of what it
learns by way of experts, its role is to determine whether the
measure that a WTO member puts in place is sufficiently
warranted by the evidence provided. This determination is
obviously easier to make when the basis for a particular assertion
is mainstream scientific thinking. It requires meeting minimum
epistemic standards as defined by the “relevant scientific
community,” for which it may solicit the assistance of experts in
the field.105 It does not require putting forth the “best science,”
100. See, e.g., Appellate Body Report, US–Continued Suspension, supra note 37,
¶¶ 7.562–7.572 (reviewing the evidence and determining it did not support the
measures taken by the European Communities).
101 . See id. ¶ 589. Previously, the AB had reached a similar conclusion in
Appellate Body Report, EC–Hormones, supra note 37, ¶ 117.
102. See Appellate Body Report, US–Continued Suspension, supra note 37, ¶¶ 589–
90.
103. See id. ¶ 591.
104. See id.
105. See id. ¶¶ 591–92.
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but rather an inquiry into whether the views expressed by a
WTO member meet such a threshold.106
Finally, a WTO member does not have to conduct its own
risk assessment, but can base its measures on the results of
scientific processes carried out by international organizations or
other members.107 It does, however, have to be specific. What
this means is that each substance that is considered to be a risk
factor must be evaluated separately; it is not permissible to
group substances together as the European Communities
(“EC”) did in EC–Hormones. Rather, a separate assessment must
be made for each substance in question with enough specificity
as to the risks that each substance represents.108 It appears that
the AB mandates more stringent requirements than what the
text of the agreement demands. This is especially true for socalled low-level risks, where the effect of a particular risk may be
so low as to be almost undetectable. While the AB consistently
declares that members can set their own levels of risk—at zero
no less109—there are situations in which the risk a substance
poses may not be ascertainable as specifically as the AB
demands, and instead, scientists may only be able to point to a
general risk associated with a particular substance.110
This is especially troublesome as the AB does not fully take
account of the multiplicity of sources from which a particular
carcinogen may originate. It is thus insufficient to make the
point that a particular substance is a known carcinogen and that
residues of that carcinogen exist in meat. The AB would require
more evidence showing a specific risk from hormone residues in
the meat whose import was in question.111 While this line of
argument is ultimately not convincing in light of the potential
dangers that such substances may pose, the AB has at least two
106. See id. ¶ 612.
107. See Appellate Body Report, EC–Hormones, supra note 37, ¶ 190.
108. See id. ¶ 201.
109. See Appellate Body Report, Australia–Salmon, supra note 37, ¶ 125.
110. See Fraiberg & Trebilcock, supra note 73, at 849–50; Evanthia DiamantiKandarakis et al., Endocrine-Disrupting Chemicals: An Endocrine Society Scientific Statement,
30 ENDOCRINE REVS. 293, 324 (2009); Valerie J. Watnick, Our Toxics Regulatory System
and Why Risk Assessment Does Not Work: Endocrine Disrupting Chemicals as a Case in Point,
2004 UTAH L. REV. 1305, 1322; see also Alan O. Sykes, Domestic Regulation, Sovereignty,
and Scientific Evidence Requirements: A Pessimistic View, 3 CHI. J. INT’L L. 353, 364–65
(2002).
111. See Appellate Body Report, EC–Hormones, supra note 37, ¶ 199.
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arguments in defense of its position: WTO members may resort
to Article 5.7 of the SPS Agreement112 to address such concerns
(although questions remain about the heightened and arguably
equally insurmountable hurdles there) and any other
interpretation would open the system up to abuse, which in turn
could pose a more systemic risk for SPS disciplines as it will
almost invariably be possible to find a scientist to argue a
particular point.
2. Implementation Stage: Putting Risk Assessment into Action
Given that the AB has consistently held that there is no
distinction between risk assessment and risk management, there
remain nevertheless questions over the implementation of the
results of the—textually required—risk assessment. According to
the AB this means that there must be an “objective
relationship” 113 between the SPS measure and the risk
assessment it is “based on.” Unlike the Panel, which had
interpreted the wording “based on” as having to conform to the
results of the risk assessment,114 the AB sees the requirements of
this language as fulfilled when a measure is “sufficiently
warrant[ed]” by the risk assessment. 115 The result is a
requirement in which the AB demands a rational relationship
between the risk assessment and the SPS measure.116 The SPS
Agreement allows WTO members to choose their appropriate
level of protection117 in its territory, regardless of whether such a
measure leads to inefficiencies in international trade. 118 The
ability of a WTO member to rely on minority views in the
process of assessing the risk further allows for considerable
policy discretion.
It is important to realize that the implementation is subject
to a number of significant caveats. First, trade measures should
be designed to minimize trade effects under Article 5.4, again
112. See infra Part III.D.
113. Appellate Body Report, EC–Hormones, supra note 37, ¶ 189.
114. See Panel Report, US–Continued Suspension, supra note 31, ¶ 8.137; Panel
Report, EC–Hormones (Canada), supra note 37, ¶ 8.140.
115. See Appellate Body Report, EC–Hormones, supra note 37, ¶ 193.
116. See Appellate Body Report, Japan–Agricultural Products II, supra note 37, ¶ 79.
117. See SPS Agreement, supra note 5, Annex A, ¶ 5.
118. VAN DEN BOSSCHE, supra note 29, at 858.
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indicating the discretion of WTO members by employing the
term “should” instead of “shall” or “must.”119 In addition, the
SPS Agreement provides for the principles of nondiscrimination and proportionality.120 Both of these principles
are arguably made effective in a moderate form, that is, it may
not be possible for a member to achieve absolute consistency in
the application of SPS measures when risks have to be combated
expeditiously. 121 Further, the measure that a WTO member
wishes to take must meet a form of proportionality testing, that
is, measures that are reasonably available achieve the member’s
chosen level of protection and which are significantly less trade
restrictive than the contested measure.122
As pointed out before, it is unclear to what extent nonscientific factors may be taken into account in implementing the
results of the risk assessment. The issue does not only arise in
the case law, 123 but has attracted considerable academic
commentary due to its contested nature. Without repeating the
arguments,124 the debate surrounding this issue has an impact
on the question at hand. Suffice it to say at this point that the
impetus for some of the authors is neither the efficacy of
scientific inquiry or the extent to which actual conclusions can
be drawn, nor of how law and science interact. Their starting
point may be that “the SPS Agreement was not drafted with the
intent of being an environmental treaty” 125 or one in which
economic efficiency is viewed as superior to other—even
potentially legitimate—concerns.126
The AB has indicated in its EC–Hormones decision that it
takes a broader view by indicating that the “available scientific
119. SPS Agreement, supra note 5, art. 5.4.
120. See SPS Agreement, supra note 5, arts. 5.5, 5.6.
121. See Appellate Body Report, EC–Hormones, supra note 37, ¶ 213.
122. See Appellate Body Report, Australia–Salmon, supra note 37, ¶ 194.
123. See Panel Report, EC–Hormones, supra note 10, ¶ 8.105; Panel Report, EC–
Hormones (Canada), supra note 37, ¶ 8.108.
124. For an overview of the literature, see generally Warren Maruyama, A New
Pillar of the WTO: Sound Science, 32 INT’L L. 651 (1998); Arcuri, supra note 85; Quick &
Blüthner, supra note 81; Winickoff et al., supra note 85; Regine Neugebauer, FineTuning WTO Jurisprudence and the SPS Agreement: Lessons from the Beef Hormone Case, 31
LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 1255 (2000). See also EDITH BROWN WEISS ET AL., RECONCILING
ENVIRONMENT AND TRADE (2d ed. 2008).
125. Neugebauer, supra note 124, at 1256.
126. See generally Quick & Blüthner, supra note 81.
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evidence” is only a starting point and that the list in Article 5.2 is
not a closed one.127 Its famous invocation of “the real world
where people live and work and die”128 shows that it is at the very
least cognizant that there may be other factors that can have an
impact on governmental decision–making.
D. The Meaning of Scientific Uncertainty and the (In)Sufficiency of
Scientific Evidence
The SPS Agreement recognizes that there may be instances
in which sufficient scientific evidence is not available at a
particular moment in time, yet nevertheless a WTO member,
having set its own “appropriate level of risk” as low (or zero),
concludes that there is a particular risk it wants to guard against.
In such a situation, Article 5.7 operates as a “qualified
exemption” to certain provisions of the SPS Agreement.129 While
the precautionary principle may be “reflected” in Article 5.7, the
provision does not serve as a ground for justifying otherwise
WTO-inconsistent measures.130 Thus, under the circumstances
laid out in Article 5.7, a WTO member may deviate from the
disciplines of Articles 2.2 and 5.1 through 5.3. This reading
leaves requirements such as non-discrimination and
proportionality intact.131
The preconditions for Article 5.7 are fourfold, the first two
of which must be met before the adoption of a provisional
measure, the latter two in order to maintain the provisional
measures. There must be: (1) insufficient scientific evidence; (2)
the measure is “adopted on the basis of available pertinent
information;” (3) a WTO member invoking this provision must
seek additional scientific information; and (4) the measure is
subject to review within a “reasonable period of time.”132
Provisional measures can thus only be put in place where
there is, at the very least, some indication that a risk exists that
may come to fruition. It is equally clear that the risk may never
127. See Appellate Body Report, EC–Hormones, supra note 37, ¶ 187.
128. See id.
129. See Panel Report, Japan Agricultural Products II, supra note 37, ¶ 80.
130. See Appellate Body Report, EC–Hormones, supra note 37, ¶ 124.
131. See SPS Agreement, supra note 5, arts. 5.5, 5.6.
132. See Appellate Body Report, Japan–Agricultural Products II, supra note 37, ¶ 89
(quoting SPS Agreement, supra note 5, art. 5.7).
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materialize. That being said, Article 5.7 mandates that scientific
evidence be “insufficient” and therefore neither covers
situations in which there is scientific uncertainty as to the risk a
member alleges,133 nor situations in which there is sufficient
evidence to carry out a risk assessment.134 Rather, the rationale
of Article 5.7 is to provide WTO Members with temporary
respite from the SPS disciplines, provided that measures are
maintained on a permanent basis only when sufficient scientific
evidence can be provided.
The AB addressed the question of insufficiency in Japan–
Measures Affecting the Importation of Apples, when it found that
such a state exists when “the body of available scientific evidence
does not allow, in quantitative or qualitative terms, the
performance of an adequate assessment of risks.” 135 In US–
Continued Suspension, the AB further elaborated on this
requirement, clarifying that as long as there is a “qualified and
respected scientific view that puts into question the relationship
between the relevant scientific evidence and the conclusions in
relation to risk, thereby not permitting the performance of a
sufficiently objective assessment of risk on the basis of the
existing scientific evidence,”136 WTO members may rely on such
a point of view. This does not require the meeting of a “critical
mass” standard that “call[s] into question the fundamental
precepts of previous knowledge and evidence so as to make
relevant, previously sufficient, evidence now insufficient,” as the
Panel in US–Continued Suspension demanded.137 The AB rightly
characterized such a requirement as a “paradigm shift,” that
would be too high a threshold for the applicability of Article 5.7,
pointing out that such fundamental shifts occur rather
infrequently.138 The Panel’s approach may also be called into

133. Panel Report, Japan–Apples, supra note 37, ¶ 184.
134. See Peter-Tobias Stoll & Lutz Strack, Article 5 SPS, in 3 MAX PLANCK
COMMENTARIES ON WORLD TRADE LAW: WTO—TECHNICAL BARRIERS AND SPS
MEASURES, ¶ 78–79 (Rüdiger Wolfrum et al. eds., 2007). A similar rationale was
proffered by the panel in the Panel Report, EC–Approval and Marketing of Biotech
Products, supra note 11, ¶ 7.2992.
135. Appellate Body Report, Japan–Apples, supra note 37, ¶ 179; see Appellate
Body Report, US–Continued Suspension, supra note 37, ¶ 674.
136. Appellate Body Report, US–Continued Suspension, supra note 37, ¶ 677.
137. Id. ¶ 7.648.
138. Id. ¶¶ 703–05.
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question on a more fundamental level. Requiring that “the new
scientific information and evidence must be such that they are at
the origin of a change in the understanding of a scientific
issue,” 139 displays that the Panel did not understand the
foundation of scientific exploration. It is simply impossible to
know “at the origin” whether such a change will in fact take
place. It is precisely the role of provisional—or precautionary—
measures to determine this in light of potentially irreversible
consequences. Thus, it is important—and the AB recognizes
this—that a WTO member be able to point to deficiencies in the
body of scientific evidence that call into question the drawing of
objective conclusions.
It should be noted moreover that the very term
“insufficiency” is not amenable to a singular interpretation and
may very well be context–dependent. This became evident in the
panel report in EC–Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products,
when one of the experts described the situation in which
national regulators may find themselves when having to choose
between expediency and greater certainty. As the Panel pointed
out: “[i]t is not always clear where the distinction lies between
what regulators ‘need to know’ vs. what is merely ‘nice to
know.’”140
Any measure must be taken “on the basis of available
pertinent information.” 141 The choice of “pertinent
information” instead of “scientific evidence” already indicates
that a member may use a broader set of sources than would be
available under the requirements for a risk assessment set forth
in Article 5.1. Clearly, the information “must be germane to
conducting such a risk assessment.”142 As is the case in Article
5.1, this information does not have to originate from the
member, but can be taken from other members or international
organizations. This requirement, however, serves to provide a
“rational and objective relationship” between the risk that a

139. Panel Report, US–Continued Suspension, supra note 37, ¶ 6.141.
140. Panel Report, EC–Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products, supra note 11,
Annex H, ¶ 14.
141. SPS Agreement, supra note 5, art. 5.7.
142. Appellate Body Report, Japan–Agricultural Products II, supra note 37, ¶ 92.
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member identifies and the provisional measure it wants to
employ.143
Once a provisional measure is in place, a WTO member
invoking this provision must seek additional information in
order to conduct an objective risk assessment within a
“reasonable period of time.”144 It is therefore obliged to actively
seek additional information to make up for the informational
deficit that has led to the institution of the provisional measure
in the first place and to review its measures on a periodic basis in
light of the information available—ultimately leading to a
member having to repeal a measure if no additional and
“better” information can be found to support the imposition of
the measure in question through the risk assessment process.145
One of the questions that necessarily arises from these
requirements is the nature and quality of the “additional
information” that is to be obtained. The sole requirement
appears to be that a member “seek[s] to obtain” more
information.146 In EC–Hormones, the AB appeared to require a
kind of roadmap in which the insufficiencies in the relevant
scientific evidence are identified and how this insufficiency may
be overcome. 147 These requirements appear uncontroversial.
The AB requires governments to show that they continue to
pursue information—ultimately in the form of scientific
evidence—of a risk which they consider to be serious enough to
deviate from the requirements of Articles 2.2 and 5.1 of the SPS
Agreement.
The reasonable amount of time given to WTO members
depends on the case at hand, so that bright line rules have not
been established. The AB was cognizant of the complex
interplay of the cases that may arise when it pointed out that the
specific circumstances of each case and the difficulty to obtain

143. Appellate Body Report, US–Continued Suspension, supra note 37, ¶ 678.
144. SPS Agreement, supra note 5, art. 5.7.
145 . For a different view, arguing that Article 5.7 should be seen as an
independent right leading to a continuous requirement for research, see Andrew T.F.
Lang, Provisional Measures under Article 5.7 of the WTO’s Agreement on Sanitary and
Phytosanitary Measures: Some Criticisms of the Jurisprudence So Far, 42 J. WORLD TRADE
1085, 1091–95 (2008).
146. Appellate Body Report, Japan–Agricultural Products II, supra note 37, ¶ 92.
147. See Appellate Body Report, US–Continued Suspension, supra note 37, ¶ 124.
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additional information may differ from case to case.148 This may
mean that, depending on the gravity of the risk at hand, a
provisional measure may be sustained for a prolonged period of
time, whereas this may not be the case for situations in which
the potential for harm is negligible.149 The AB’s position is in
line with its previous jurisprudence that gave governments
considerable—though
not
unfettered—discretion
when
deciding whether to resort to precautionary and provisional
measures when there is insufficient information to conduct a
risk assessment.
III. RISK AS A SCIENTIFIC UNDERTAKING: TRANSFORMING
SCIENCE INTO LEGAL CATEGORIES
This section addresses the question of how to “translate” or
integrate the results of scientific inquiries into legal decisions. As
shown above, the processes, procedures, and underlying
philosophies of law and science differ considerably. At the same
time, the SPS Agreement shows that science plays a pivotal role
in the dispute settlement process concerning SPS measures. This
is not a question that is confined to the realm of WTO law, but
rather touches a large variety of areas in which law considers
scientific conclusions. These conclusions may not be fully
determinative, but at the very least highly indicative. This may be
said for such diverse fields as environmental law, criminal law
(e.g., DNA evidence), as well as tort law.150
There are a number of schools of thought that have
addressed this question, which is undergoing growth and
complexity as scientific insight increases.151 It is also a field that
148. Appellate Body Report, Japan–Agricultural Products II, supra note 37, ¶ 93.
149. The AB’s flexibility regarding provisional measures can be contrasted with
the Panel’s stricter approach. See, e.g., Appellate Body Report, Australia–Salmon, supra
note 37, ¶ 8.57 (finding a measure imposed over twenty years ago “can thus hardly be
seen as a measure ‘provisionally’ adopted”).
150. See Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 130 S. Ct. 2743, 2758 (2010)
(detailing proceedings in which both parties in environmental litigation relied upon
scientific experts with wildly different conclusions based on the same material);
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 588 (1993) (relying on scientific
expert testimony in tort); United States v. Sullivan, 246 F. Supp. 2d 700, 702–03 (E.D.
Ky. 2003) (relying on scientific expert testimony in a criminal prosecution).
151. For early attempts at delineation, see generally K.S. SHRADER-FRECHETTE,
RISK AND RATIONALITY: PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS FOR POPULIST REFORMS (1991);
Susanna Hornig, Reading Risk: Public Response to Print Media Accounts of Technological
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draws expertise from a large variety of other disciplines: science;
science studies; economics; political science; sociology;
humanities; ethics; psychology; and law. There are schools of
thought that are based on rational choice scholarship, though
their views on how legal conclusions can be based on scientific
results varies considerably, and therefore it appears impossible
to describe these schools of thought under one single rubric.
Others schools of thought consider rational choice
scholarship—by its nature—to be incomplete, and prefer, in
situations of evidentiary insufficiency, to rely on the
precautionary principle.152 Moreover, and partially overlapping,
social science scholars have pointed out the need to take nonscientific elements into consideration to a considerable extent
when making potentially far-reaching decisions concerning the
permissibility of governmental measures.
It is self-explanatory that the delineation between these
different schools of thought offered below is open to debate and
that there exists considerable overlap between some of the
approaches outlined below. Nevertheless, the categorization is
designed to illuminate the differing approaches that can be
brought to bear on this question—both generally when law and
science interact, but also more specifically with respect to WTO
law. Before turning to a description of these transmission
models, it is helpful to briefly outline the concept of risk, what is
understood by the term, how its extent can be determined, and
what may lead to uncertainties about its extent.153
A. What is Risk?
Risk has historically been a subject of considerable interest,
first developing in areas such as investment and gambling—
areas in which the participants have a great interest to
Risk, 2 PUB. UNDERSTANDING SCI. 95 (1993); see also Paul B. Thompson & Wesley Dean,
Competing Conceptions of Risk, 7 RISK 361, 365–66 (1996). For early legal approaches, see
generally PETER ASCH, CONSUMER SAFETY REGULATION: PUTTING A PRICE ON LIFE AND
LIMB (1988). In the WTO context, see Arcuri, supra note 85, at 209–12, distinguishing
between groups that follow a quantitative-risk logic and a holistic-group logic.
152. ROBERT N. BELLAH ET AL., THE GOOD SOCIETY 122 (1992) (quoting a US
government agent describing cost-benefit analysis as “ignor[ing] whatever risks can’t be
measured”).
153. For an example of one of the myriad of definitions (of the conceptions) of
risk, see Thompson & Dean, supra note 151, at 365.
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determine the payoff for a particular decision they are
making.154 This approach to determining the potential negative
impacts of any course of action was subsequently taken up by
other fields such as insurance and engineering, each developing
its own inquiries into how to understand risk. 155 What has
emerged is a general understanding of risk that includes certain
elements. This includes the likelihood of a particular risk
multiplied by the gravity of the harm that would result. The
resulting overall factor of risk is a probabilistic determination of
a risk coming to fruition, involving a certain magnitude.156 This
very thin description of the concept of risk does not contain all
the elements that traditionally enter a risk determination. In
addition, and especially in the natural sciences, factors such as
variability and uncertainty play a role. The former is a testament
to the fact that the responses individuals have to the exposure to
an agent are different. The latter is recognition of the
incompleteness of scientific data, which can stem from the
existence of competing datasets, lack of perfect data, or
competing theories of what conclusions are to be drawn from a
dataset.157
The result is usually a statement from scientific experts as to
the existence and magnitude of risk, containing the following
criteria: exposure to a particular agent involves the probability
of adverse effects; these effects are variable depending on the
individual who is exposed to the agent and will be given on a
scale of probability including built-in buffers accounting for the
uncertainty in determining the probability.158 This is the result
of how science works, an aspect often misunderstood by non154. See Ronald N. Giere, Knowledge, Values, and Technological Decisions: A Decision
Theoretic Approach, in ACCEPTABLE EVIDENCE: SCIENCE AND VALUES IN RISK
MANAGEMENT 183, 183 (Deborah G. Mayo & Rachelle D. Hollander eds., 1991)
(describing how decisions about new technology moved from the private sphere to
become increasingly public after World War II); PETER L. BERNSTEIN, AGAINST THE
GODS: THE REMARKABLE STORY OF RISK 1–6 (1996).
155. Chauncey Starr, Social Benefit versus Technological Risk, 165 SCIENCE 1232,
1232 (1969); J.D. HAMMOND, ESSAYS IN THE THEORY OF RISK AND INSURANCE, preface
(1968).
156. See CRAWFORD-BROWN, supra note 38, at 5. Note that there is an important
distinction to instances when an event is certain to occur, in which case one uses the
term consequences rather than risk.
157. Crawford-Brown et al., supra note 13, at 463.
158. Id.
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scientists (including lawyers, judges and adjudicators): science is
able to explain causal relations with a great deal of accuracy only
in relatively simple analyses. The more variables a system has
and thus the higher the degree of complexity (e.g., nuclear
power plants or climate change), the more challenging if not
impossible it is to prove with a high degree of certainty what is to
be assessed. Any attempt at translating the results of this “view
through a blurry window at the truth” must reconcile with this
obstacle.159 It remains a matter of considerable debate whether
non-scientific elements enter the determination of whether a
risk exists,160 a question that is also dependent on whether the
participants in the debate are experts or ordinary persons.161
B. Rational Choice Models
At one end of the spectrum are those that promote a purely
probabilistic determination of risk and do not take into account
the potential consequences that may arise. It is only a theoretical
model and the view, in its pure form, is generally not held by
authors. However, there are proponents of models whose own
understanding is largely aligned with a considerable portion of
this understanding of risk, while others prefer a more holistic
rational choice model.
1. Probabilistic Models
Strong forms of risk determination rely on probabilistic
methods which rely on quantitative analysis to arrive at an
assessment of a particular risk. A classic example of this
understanding is Chauncey Starr’s and Chris Whipple’s “Risks of

159. John D. Graham & Lorenz Rhomberg, How Risks Are Identified and Assessed,
545 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 15, 19 (1996).
160. See infra Part V.
161. Note the debate surrounding risk assessment is carried out by experts and by
the public, with sometimes fundamental differences. See Slovic, supra note 4, at 281
(providing empirical evidence for the different perceptions of risk by experts and the
public); Roger E. Kasperson & Jeanne X. Kasperson, The Social Amplification and
Attenuation of Risk, 545 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 95, 101 (1996) (noting the
effect of ordinary people’s social amplification of risk). See generally Ann Bostrom, Risk
Perceptions: “Experts” vs. “Lay People,” 8 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 101 (1997); HOWARD
MARGOLIS, DEALING WITH RISK: WHY THE PUBLIC AND THE EXPERTS DISAGREE ON
ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES (1996).

184 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 35:151
Risk Decisions.”162 The core of their argument is that analysis is “a
process based on collected data, anecdotal cases, and statistics,
any of which may or may not be correct; and, based on these, we
invent simplified models to predict an outcome.” 163 This
projected outcome contains, as the authors admit, “a large
uncertainty in the predictions,” yet they feel that their model is
superior because of the importance of “improv[ing] the quality
of decision-making.”164
The role of risk analysis is not to be conflated with the role
that decision-makers fulfill. However, the latter’s role must take
into account intangible costs, but for whom proper risk
assessment is essential. Difficulties exist in measuring these
intangible costs, that may differ depending on who is being
interrogated. This leads the representatives of this approach to
not conduct an investigation into what they call the intuitive risk
assessment involving perceptions about a risk (such as the
dangers emanating from nuclear power plants), rather than
scientific, probabilistic data.165
2. Rational Choice Theory Meets Law: Law and Economics
Various iterations of rational choice theory have found
their way into the legal academy. Concerned with law’s reliance
on intuitions about fairness and justice and—at least from
today’s perspective—based on Ronald Coase’s highly influential
1960 article “The Problem of Social Cost,” 166 a remarkably
influential school of thought has emerged, especially in the
United States.167 The proliferation of the rational choice theory,
first developed in economics, has necessarily produced a large

162. Chauncey Starr & Chris Whipple, Risks of Risk-Decisions, 208 SCIENCE 1114
(1980).
163. Id. at 1115. For an institutionalized approach, proposing a “science court,”
see generally Arthur Kantrowitz, Proposal for an Institution for Scientific Judgment, 156
SCIENCE 763 (1967).
164. Starr & Whipple, supra note 162, at 1115.
165. See id. at 1116.
166. See generally R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960).
Other early influential works include RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW
(4th ed. 1992); Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL.
ECON. 169 (1968); Richard Epstein, Law and Economics: Its Glorious Past and Cloudy
Future, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1167 (1997).
167. For a brief history, see Epstein, supra note 166, at 1168.
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number of subfields in legal academia and has sparked
considerable revisions of the original model.168 At its core lies
the inquiry of what choice a rational person will make given
certain preferences. Because of the prevalence of rational
choice theory in the fields of economics, sociology, political
science, and law, the theory has had considerable influence not
only in the way academics think about problems, but also in the
policy field.169 In an informal way, rational choice theory posits
that individual or group choice must be deliberative and
consistent. 170 The premise for this view is a reasoned
justification, providing the rationale for the choice made.
Moreover, on the basis of this reasoning, it can be expected that
the choice does not change inexplicably and the means chosen
for the attainment of the goals pursued are reasonably wellsuited. 171 More convincing is the approach that posits the
transitive nature of consumers’ preferences who seek to
maximize the utility derived from such preferences. The origins
of the theory explained consumer decisions, which are, to a
large degree, quantifiable. Inherent in this approach is a
reliance on empirical data on the basis of which decision
making can be improved. Thus, when evaluating risk, rational
choice theory, at least in the past, has encouraged the collection
and subsequent dissemination of information so that “correct”
decisions may be made. The advantage of this approach is,
naturally similar to the previous model, that its results yield
empirically confirmed predictions.
Although these observations apply as much to the purely
probabilistic school of thought outlined above, there are
important objections that can be raised both with respect to this
model as well as the previous one. For example, the market
choices that the model was invented for are frequent and
routine (such as purchasing toothpaste), whereas a decision
over whom to marry or whether to permit hormone-treated beef
to be imported into a WTO member’s territory is one of more
168. See, e.g., Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Rational Choice and the Framing of
Decisions, in DECISION MAKING: DESCRIPTIVE, NORMATIVE, AND PRESCRIPTIVE
INTERACTIONS 167, 167 (David E. Bell et al. eds., 1988).
169. Thomas S. Ulen, Rational Choice and the Economic Analysis of the Law, 19 LAW &
SOC.’Y INQUIRY 487, 49 (1994).
170. Id. 791–92.
171. See generally ROBERT NOZICK, THE NATURE OF RATIONALITY (1993).
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general applicability; prices for products are comparable as the
market reflects consumer preferences through a specific price
point, whereas it is more difficult to determine the price for
intangible goods that can be valued differently by individuals.
Finally, it is difficult to determine the optimal decision when
non-market choices are involved and there may simply not be a
correct choice; in these cases it may not be transparent what has
led to a particular choice.172
In the case of uncertainty or insufficiency of information,
rational choice theory may not provide adequate prediction
models either. As is the case in the natural sciences, the more
complex a problem and the more variables involved, the less
potent rational choice theory is. While purporting to avoid the
biases that are inherent in decision making, rational choice
theory’s starting point is what opens the approach to criticism. It
presupposes unbiased decision making because of unbounded
rationality and unbounded self-interest.
3. Behavioral Economics, or: Cognitive Psychology
Distinct from the representatives of law and economics just
outlined are those, that while building on and refining the
previous model, 173 favor behavioral economics as a basis for
decision making. Positing that the model of homo economicus is
incomplete in that it ignores the contributions of cognitive and
social psychologists, this approach places a higher emphasis on
social, cognitive, and even emotional factors than does rational
choice theory.174 It has also spawned a considerable amount of
literature on the question of how to deal with risk and
uncertainty.175 By and large, this literature has focused on how
172. Thomas S. Ulen, The Growing Pains of Behavioral Law and Economics, 51 VAND.
L. REV. 1747, 1759 (1998).
173. Id. at 1748. Indeed, one of the most prominent representatives of rational
choice theory has assumed the post of Head of the Office of Information and
Regulatory Affairs at the White House, which reviews regulations under cost-benefit
considerations. See Benjamin Wallace-Wells, Cass Sunstein Wants to Nudge Us, N.Y. TIMES,
May 16, 2010 (Magazine), at 38.
174. Ulen, supra note 172, at 1748.
175. See, e.g., Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment under Uncertainty:
Heuristics and Biases, 185 SCIENCE 1124, 1124, 1131 (1974); Steven L. Schwarcz, Systemic
Risk, 97 GEO. L.J. 193 (2008); Vern R. Walker, Risk: Health, Safety & Environment, 9 RISK
27 (1998).
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individuals make decisions through the use of simplifying
heuristics or shortcuts designed to make complex decisions
simpler and more manageable.176 Such shortcuts are useful, as
otherwise individuals would be overburdened by having to
carefully analyze probabilities for every decision that they make
throughout the day.177 However, in highly complex situations,
these heuristics are inadequate to fully assess the risk that
confronts an individual or society.178
A concise version of this view can be described as follows:
the availability of a danger in an individual’s mind may bring
particular and familiar risks to mind at the expense of other,
more salient ones (the availability heuristic); individuals often
neglect risks that are highly salient in exchange for focusing on
the worst case scenario (probability neglect); individuals are
averse to change in the status quo (loss aversion); humaninduced risks are more suspect than the risks produced by
nature (benevolence of nature); and people do not recognize
secondary effects or risks that are not directly related to their
own activity (system neglect).179 In this version of behavioral
economics, rather than basing decisions on the precautionary
principle, complex decisions are based on a narrow anticatastrophe principle, which is moderated by a cost-benefit
analysis.180 This in turn may lead to a decision-making process
that Cass Sunstein calls “libertarian paternalism.”181
There are a number of principled objections to this
approach.182 The “anti-catastrophe principle” that is brought to
bear against the precautionary principle requires the
176 . See, e.g., Gregory N. Mandel, Technology Wars: The Failure of Democratic
Discourse, 11 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 117, 158 (2005).
177. Id.
178. See id.
179. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LAWS OF FEAR: BEYOND THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE
35–49 (2005).
180. Id. at 114.
181. Id. at 176. Sunstein understands the concept of “libertarian paternalism” to
be an approach through which welfare is promoted while maintaining an individual’s
ability to largely choose their own actions. A more detailed defense of this concept can
be found in Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, Libertarian Paternalism Is Not an
Oxymoron, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1159 (2003).
182. See DOUGLAS A. KYSAR, REGULATING FROM NOWHERE: ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
AND THE SEARCH FOR OBJECTIVITY 71, 1–22 (2010). The author presents an excellent
criticism of what is seen by some scholars as an overreliance on cost-benefit analysis in
risk assessment.
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identification of all risks that a certain action may entail against
the risk of inaction.183 The ability to assess these risks suffers
from the same limitations as other approaches in that science
may not be able to provide sufficient data to make an informed
decision. Furthermore, the principle would not apply to
situations where costs are high (for example climate change),184
thereby rendering the principle inoperative in the situations
that adjudicatory bodies often face. The same applies to the
modified cost-benefit analysis that forms part of this analysis.185
While the results of this analysis are not determinative—a
departure from previously described versions of this more
general school of thought—it remains unclear how precise the
data for such an assessment can be.186 Sunstein’s proposed use
of willingness-to-pay is an attempt to better demarcate the costs,
but it is just as subjective and problematic at providing a value
for harm that is spatially and temporally removed. An example
of this would be climate change or any other complex problem
the effects of which may only materialize after the passage of
considerable time.
C. Precaution-Based Jurisprudence
A further step away from probability-based approaches is
what may be termed precaution-based jurisprudence. The
debate about the salience of the precautionary principle is an
arduous one—this is not the place to describe it or the history of
the precautionary principle in great detail.187 Suffice it to say
that the debate has yielded a plethora of versions of the
precautionary principle. On the one end of the spectrum are
those who favor banning all technology that poses a potential
negative health or environmental impact, even in situations
where the probability of harm cannot be ascertained. On the

183. SUNSTEIN, supra note 179, at 113.
184. Id. at 113–15.
185. Id. at 129–32.
186. For a critique focusing on the problem of disentangling values and facts, see
Susan A. Bandes, Emotions, Values, and the Construction of Risk, 156 U. PA. L. REV.
PENNUMBRA 421, 427 (2008).
187. For more information on this topic, see generally Jaye Ellis, ‘Overexploitation’
of a Valuable Resource? New Literature on the Precautionary Principle, 17 EUR. J. INT’L L. 445
(2007).
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other end are those who argue against too prevalent a use of the
precautionary principle as it may prevent innovation.188
The more serious versions of the precautionary principle
recognize the importance of scientific evidence at its core, but
also take seriously that science has inherent limitations in what
evidence it is capable of providing.189 This requires a careful
delineation of the core elements of the precautionary principle.
Otherwise, there is a considerable danger of arbitrary invocation
of the precautionary principle by domestic governments.190 The
situations in which the precautionary principle finds application
are characterized by: (1) uncertainty about the occurrence of
harm, especially in highly complex matters; (2) uncertainty
about the risks of human behavior; and (3) the ability of
governments to take action in the face of such uncertainties.191
One feature of the precautionary principle is an inherent
element of flexibility. It does not dictate a specific regulatory
measure, but rather allows for a variety of measures to be taken
by domestic governments. While it can support measures to
protect the public from environmental and health risks, the
precautionary principle is constrained by the requirements of
proportionality, nondiscrimination, consistency, and a (not
necessarily economic) 192 cost-benefit analysis. Importantly,
precautionary principle statements often contain a verification
element, that is, an obligation to further consider the situation
that has triggered the reliance on the precautionary principle in
the first place.
The legal status of the precautionary principle remains
unclear at this point, although it has been a contentious issue in
WTO jurisprudence. The most that the AB has said so far is that
188. Id.
189. JACQUELINE PEEL, THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE IN PRACTICE:
ENVIRONMENTAL DECISION-MAKING AND SCIENTIFIC UNCERTAINTY 21–22 (2005). Some
of the proponents of behavioral science do not shun the precautionary principle in its
entirety, but do support a weak version of the precautionary principle. See, e.g.,
SUNSTEIN, supra note 179, at 117–22.
190. For an example of this tension, see Annecoos Wiersema, Adversaries or
Partners? Science and the Precautionary Principle in International Wildlife Treaty Regimes, 11
J. INT’L WILDLIFE L.& POL’Y 211 (2008)
191. Arie Trouwborst, The Precautionary Principle in General International Law:
Combating the Babylonian Confusion, 16 REV. EUR. COMMUNITY INT’L EVTL. L. 185 (2007).
192. See Commission Communication on the Precautionary Principle, COM
(2000) 1, ¶ 6(3).
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the precautionary principle finds reflection in various provisions
of the SPS Agreement and that, especially in cases where risks
may be irreversible, “responsible, representative governments
commonly act from perspectives of prudence and
precaution.”193 Similar to other international bodies,194 the AB
did not pronounce that the precautionary principle was a legal
concept of universal application in international law.195
In the WTO context, the precautionary principle has been
most forcefully defended by the EC in cases concerning
hormone-treated beef and the potential dangers of genetically
modified organisms in food. The underlying idea for the use of
the precautionary principle is that in the absence of scientific
evidence linking growth hormones to the development of
cancer in consumers, the EC was nevertheless basing its decision
to ban meat treated with particular hormones on indications
that such a risk existed.
D. Risk Assessment as a Value-Dependent Exercise
Finally, another school has emerged that emphasizes the
importance of including social and cultural values in the risk
assessment procedure. This approach has been discussed in
more general terms for some time now 196 and has received
considerable attention in the WTO context.197 This school of
thought argues that expert judgments are under particular
scrutiny the more an issue is in the public eye.198 This may lead
to unconscious influence on experts due to “pre-existing policy
preferences,” media representations, or the mere exposure to

193. Appellate Body Report, US–Continued Suspension, supra note 37, ¶ 124.
194. See, e.g., The MOX Plant Case (Ir. v. U.K.), Case No. 10, Order of Dec. 3,
2001,
¶ 75,
http://www.itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/documents/cases/case_no_10/
Order.03.12.01.E.pdf.
195. Appellate Body Report, EC–Hormones, supra note 37, ¶ 123. The AB found it
“unnecessary, and probably imprudent . . . to take a position on this important, but
abstract, question.” Id.
196. See generally Thompson & Dean, supra note 151; Kasperson & Kasperson,
supra note 161; Alonzo Plough & Sheldon Krimsky, The Emergence of Risk Communication
Studies: Social and Political Context, 12 SCI. TECH. & HUMAN VALUES 4 (1987).
197. See generally Winickoff et al., supra note 85; Foster, supra note 85; Lang, supra
note 145; Epps, supra note 85.
198. See Winickoff et al., supra note 85, at 99. See generally Ellis, supra note 187.
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colleagues who may influence an individual’s risk perception.199
Where stakes are higher, this issue is of even more concern:
nuclear power is often cited as an example where cognitive
dissonance is at its most visible, or at least all but unavoidable.200
This is especially so in the context of what Alvin Weinberg calls
“trans-science:” situations in which science may be able to ask
the questions, but is unable to provide the answers because they
involve the resolution of social problems that are not amenable
to resolution through the procedures science has at its
disposal.201
In the context of the WTO this has led some authors to
conclude that in the face of scientific uncertainty, a “WTO
Member should be able to defend sanitary or phytosanitary
measures on the basis that its population simply does not want
to run a given risk.”202 This view is premised on decisions being
made in a responsible fashion by democratically elected
governments and following a deliberative process. 203 Despite
recognizing the potential for abuse, the majority of the
proponents of this view remain committed to the idea that
inherent elements of democracy justify this approach.204
For one, some authors believe that social science research
may mitigate unavoidable perception problems that may arise
because of the politicization of issues, the potential
disadvantageous treatment that foreign products may receive
over domestic products purely on the basis of their foreign
origin in governmental discourse, as well as the almost inevitable
media bias that may arise in such situations.205 These objections
199. Harvey Brooks, The Resolution of Technically Intensive Public Policy Disputes, 9
SCI. TECH. & HUMAN VALUES 39, 40 (1984).
200. See, e.g., Winickoff et al., supra note 85, at 97; Alvin M. Weinberg, Science and
Its Limits: The Regulator’s Dilemma, in DE MINIMIS RISK 27, 27–38 (Chris Whipple ed.,
1987).
201. See generally Alvin M. Weinberg, Science and Trans-Science, 10 MINERVA 209
(1979).
202. Foster, supra note 85, at 432.
203. See generally Howse, supra note 88, at 2340–43. As Howse points out, the
central contribution of science under this view is that it contributes to democratic
rationality in the risk assessment. Id.; see also Walker, supra note 85, at 197; cf. ROBIN
FELDMAN, THE ROLE OF SCIENCE IN LAW 157 (2009).
204. See Winickoff et al., supra note 85, at 85, 99, 122–23.
205. See Joanne Scott & Ellen Vos, The Juridification of Uncertainty: Observations on
the Ambivalence of the Precautionary Principle within the EU and the WTO, in GOOD
GOVERNANCE IN EUROPE’S INTEGRATED MARKET 253, 285–86 (Christian Joerges &
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are countered with the importance of human life and health
that may be at stake and are ameliorated with the requirement
to show the proportionality of any measure in relation to the risk
that a WTO member wishes to counter.206
Whether the lack of importance attached to public opinion
in the case law so far results in this question being “an open one
at present”207 is debatable. The AB’s comment that the world is
not a laboratory, but rather a place where “people live and work
and die” is cryptic at best and can be interpreted in a multitude
of ways. Combined with the AB’s finding that the list of factors
that may be taken into account in conducting a risk assessment
under Article 5.2 of the SPS Agreement is not a closed one, the
argument may be more powerful. But, at least to date, there is
nothing in the case law to indicate that the dispute settlement
organs are moving toward the inclusion of public opinion in
assessing risk. Moreover, it may not always be clear whether
governments use a genuine deliberative process in carrying out
a risk assessment and the conditions under which a discourse
takes place may already predicate the outcome.
E. Pure Contextualist Understanding of Risk
Less significant than the previous schools of thought is a
purely contextualist understanding of risk that places equal
importance on probability, voluntariness, and familiarity. This
school of thought is more than just a step removed from a
scientific understanding of risk. Rather, a host of attributes are
taken into account, but none of them is considered essential;
any one factor, including scientific evidence, may not play any
role at all.208 According to this school of thought, risk may be
equated with unfamiliarity and the language of risk used to
express this sentiment with a particular product or process,
because the use of a technology may not have been introduced

Renaud Dehousse eds., 2002); Caroline E. Foster, Social Science Experts and Amicus
Curiae Briefs in International Courts and Tribunals: The WTO Biotech Case, 52 NETH. INT’L
L. REV. 433, 449–53 (2005); Andrew Green & Tracey Epps, The WTO, Science, and the
Environment: Moving towards Consistency, 10 J. INT’L ECON. L. 285, 304–05 (2007).
206. Foster, supra note 85, at 450.
207. Id. at 444.
208. See Thompson & Dean, supra note 151, at 369.
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in this societal context.209 This may be the case in situations
where there is no measurable harm at all, but rather the term
risk is used in what one may call non-technical, conveying
unfamiliarity with the practice or technology that is under
consideration. Important for present purposes is that the
proponents of this view believe that “cultural and experiential
inputs” have equal importance compared to the probabilistic
model, which they describe as “reductionist, focusing on
quantifiable variables.”210
F. Summary
It is clear that in the absence of clear scientific evidence,
the results of the scientific inquiry must somehow be
“translated” into the adjudicatory process. While risk assessment
has inherent limitations, it has proven to be an indispensable
tool in the decision-making process. It is capable of providing a
more rational basis on which to make such decisions.
Additionally, risk assessment provides the basis for
administrative decision making in democratic states. When
carried out responsibly, a risk assessment can respond to
subsequent inquiry, it may be reviewed by others, and tested for
accuracy. How such a translation is to take place depends largely
on the importance of various factors, which, depending on one’s
point of view, either form part of the risk assessment or should
enter the process at a later stage. Different schools of thought
hold divergent views on how to deal with scientific evidence that
may not be sufficient. As has become clear, these transmission
mechanisms exist on a continuum, ranging from purely
probabilistic versions of risk assessment to those that are purely
contextualist.
Scientific evidence provides clear answers in only the rarest
of circumstances. Its proper role is best understood as an
attempt to determine the probability of harm given a set of
predetermined conditions. Moreover, and crucially, science
does not address the acceptability of the risk that may exist. This
is ultimately a question for policy-makers. The next section of
this Article addresses the manner in which these decisions have
209. See id. at 374.
210. Plough & Krimsky, supra note 196, at 7.
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been adjudicated in the context of the WTO and thus a
pluralistic society.
IV. WTO JURISPRUDENCE AND RISK: AN UNCOMFORTABLE
RELATIONSHIP
Panels and the AB have, at various times and in various
compositions, had to handle questions of how and to what
extent scientific evidence should be used in their decisionmaking processes. In the context of translating the results of
scientific inquiry into legal categories, WTO dispute settlement
organs have a variety of different options they can choose from.
The range is extensive and—to a certain extent—what road is
chosen may predetermine the outcome of the case before a
panel or the AB. Consciously or not, panelists or AB members
fall into one or a combination of these categories.
In a first step, it is useful to identify the schools of thought
that do not find support in the language of the SPS Agreement.
Neither purely probabilistic risk assessment nor the purely
contextualist approach have found their way into WTO law. The
very inclusion of Article 5.7 in the SPS Agreement—in which,
according to the AB, the precautionary principle finds
reflection—is a testament to the recognition that scientific
inquiry is faced with inherent limitations. Similarly, the SPS
Agreement’s insistence on showing “sufficient scientific
evidence” is a testament to an approach that cannot be based
purely on a culturally determined understanding of risk.
The relevant approaches thus range from rational choice
theory to a values-based jurisprudence. Both the SPS Agreement
itself and the jurisprudence to date can provide insights into
what approach may be the most appropriate given the distinct
languages that both science and law possess. There appears to
be a disparity between the panels and the AB stage in
adjudicating the SPS disputes to date. At the risk of
oversimplifying, it appears that the panels’ track record has
rarely reached beyond an approach that fits by and large the
rational choice model. While panels paid lip-service to the
jurisprudence of the AB, it is remarkable that, until the decision
in EC–Hormones, panel reports have largely stayed uninfluenced
by AB findings. The AB, on the other hand, has, beginning in its
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very first finding on the SPS Agreement, hinted at giving WTO
members considerable policy space. 211 The reluctance of the
panels—taken as a whole—is all the more remarkable given that
the panel stage is designed as an organ without a great deal of
permanency212 and is subject to appellate review.213 Unlike the
AB, panelists are temporary adjudicators, called upon to serve in
individual disputes.214 Thus, one can only speculate as to the
reasons for the continued recalcitrance shown by the Panels on
this issue.
This distinction becomes clearer when juxtaposing the
findings of the panels and the AB in various instances. While a
full review of the cases is beyond the scope of this Article and
moreover unnecessary, the following analysis shows the
dichotomy between the approaches that the panels and the AB
have taken. This rift has, if anything, widened under the
decision by the AB in the US–Continued Suspension case.
This distinction began early on in the disputes concerning
the SPS Agreement—and at a fundamental level. The very first
dispute brought to light the direction that the AB has followed
ever since, by reversing the panel’s distinction between a stage of
risk assessment and risk management.215 Not only did the AB
point out that there was no textual basis for the distinction
between two such stages, but it arguably felt that this delineation
between a science-based stage and one in which non-scientific,
political decisions were to be made was too neat a dissection as
to comport with reality.
Next, the AB, unlike the Panel in EC–Hormones, made clear
that WTO members could not only rely on quantitative data in
carrying out their risk assessment, but that the use of qualitative

211. Appellate Body Report, EC–Hormones, supra note 37, ¶ 124.
212. See J.H.H. Weiler, The Rule of Lawyers and the Ethos of Diplomats: Reflections on
the Internal and External Legitimacy of WTO Dispute Settlement, 35 J. WORLD TRADE 191,
202 (2001). Out of the seven SPS disputes at the panel stage, five have been decided by
panelists that have sat on more than one panel. Namely, panelists Bergholm, Cartland,
Häberli, and Orozco have all sat on two panels. Out of six SPS disputes before the AB,
only three have seen repeat players, which is not as surprising as the results at the panel
stage given the design of the AB as a body composed of permanent members.
213. See Felix David, The Role of Precedent in the WTO—New Horizons? 10
(Maastricht Faculty of Law, Working Paper No. 2009-12, 2009).
214. Weiler, supra note 212, at 202.
215. Appellate Body Report, EC–Hormones, supra note 37, ¶ 181.
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data is also permissible.216 The AB thus again acknowledged that
purely or even highly probabilistic risk assessments may not be
able to capture the entirety of risk, but rather that there may be
instances in which science has not yet advanced far enough to
provide clear evaluations of how likely the realization of risk may
be. Again, this potentially wide latitude of discretion was cabined
through the requirement that there must be an “identifiable” or
“ascertainable” risk, rather than merely theoretical
uncertainty.217
The AB found that the list of factors that may be taken into
account in carrying out a risk assessment according to Article 5.2
of the SPS Agreement is not a closed one.218 It did so from the
very beginning and has continued to do so against panel
findings which consistently imply that the list is at the very least
limited to methods that lead to a probabilistic outcome.219 It may
be unfortunate that the AB has not made a clearer
pronouncement on what it considers to be the boundaries for
factors that may be taken into account in carrying out a risk
assessment. Two lines of demarcation can be drawn however. A
risk assessment is at its core a scientific undertaking, which
implies that an overly-contextualized risk assessment is not
acceptable. At the same time, given the AB’s general approach
to science outlined above overreliance on rational choice type
methodologies is equally outside of the acceptable realm for the
AB.
These considerations are related to the question of setting
the appropriate level of protection. As has been pointed out by
the AB numerous times, it is the prerogative of the individual

216. Appellate Body Report, EC–Hormones, supra note 37, ¶ 253(j); Appellate
Body Report, Japan–Apples, supra note 37, ¶ 179; See Panel Report, EC–Hormones
(Canada), supra note 37, ¶ 8.106.
217. Appellate Body Report, Australia–Salmon, supra note 37, ¶ 125; Appellate
Body Report, EC–Hormones, supra note 37, ¶ 186; see also Andrew T. Guzman, Food Fears:
Health and Safety at the WTO, 45 VA. J. INT’L L. 1, 8 (2004).
218. Appellate Body Report, EC–Hormones, supra note 37, ¶¶ 187, 253(j).
219. For an overview of the jurisprudence of the early SPS cases, see generally
Joost Pauwelyn, The WTO Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) Measures as
Applied in the First Three SPS Disputes EC–Hormones, Australia–Salmon and Japan–Varietals,
2 J. INT’L ECON. L. 641 (1999); see also Kevin C. Kennedy, Resolving International Sanitary
and Phytosanitary Disputes in the WTO: Lessons and Future Directions, 55 FOOD & DRUG L.J.
81, 91–99 (2000).
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WTO member to set the appropriate level of protection.220 WTO
members do not enjoy complete discretion in this regard, as a
member’s policy space is limited by the requirements of nondiscrimination and proportionality in Articles 5.5 and 5.6.221
Nevertheless, the AB recognized that the appropriate level of
protection can be set at zero.222
Equally important, and divisive between some panels and
the AB, has been the question of whether and if so, to what
extent, it is acceptable for WTO members to rely on divergent
scientific opinions in their risk assessment.223 In this context it is
important to remember that the AB has reminded the panels
numerous times that they cannot substitute their own
considerations for the risk assessment of WTO members.224 The
proper task for the panel is therefore not to attempt to find the
“best science,” but rather to inquire whether the scientific
methods used in the process of assessing risk are accepted in the
relevant scientific community.225 It almost appears as if the Panel
in EC–Continued Suspension was fighting a rearguard action when
it suggested a requirement of “critical mass” of evidence in the
context of Article 5.7 of the SPS Agreement.226 When pressed for
the origin of this standard, the Panel pointed out that the idea
was prevalent in the sciences, especially in mathematics and
physics.227 These findings were received with strong opposition
by the AB, which made clear that it saw no basis for such a
“critical mass” standard as it would almost by necessity require a
paradigm shift in scientific discovery that, in the words of the
AB, “is not frequent.”228 This may be the prime example of how
a panel either misunderstood the process of scientific inquiry or
understood scientific evidence as consisting of almost entirely
probabilistic inquiries. As pointed out above, such a narrow view
of science is not commensurate with the realities of scientific
discovery.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.

See, e.g., Appellate Body Report, EC–Hormones, supra note 37, ¶ 124.
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Outside of the confines of the SPS Agreement, it has been
argued 229 that a further liberalization of the SPS disciplines
could contravene the general rule contained in Article 19.2 of
the DSU, which states that dispute settlement organs “cannot
add to or diminish the rights and obligations provided in the
covered agreements.”230 Whether this is indeed the case is open
to debate. There is a difference between the rights and
obligations that WTO members have and the expectations that
WTO members derive from the agreements. It is certainly true
that the panels and the AB do not enjoy unfettered discretion,
but the degree to which this discretion can be exercised is
debatable. This means that, taking the above spectrum as a
yardstick, purely contextual approaches do not fit into the
structure of the SPS Agreement. The same is probably true for
the value-based jurisprudential approach as it also leaves too
much discretion to member states. If the (not uncontroversial)
goal of trade liberalization, with all its attendant costs and
benefits, is to be taken seriously, then giving countries
unfettered discretion to block trade is hard to reconcile with
that goal. The AB recognizes not only the distinction between
the languages of science and law as a technical challenge, but
also recognizes that the role of adjudicatory bodies is to balance
two competing objectives that are not only mentioned in the
preamble of the SPS Agreement, but that are inherent in WTO
law: the protection of human, animal or plant life or health on
the one hand and trade liberalization on the other.
CONCLUSION
The interplay between science and law is more complicated
than first meets the eye. And it is certainly more complex than
the neat and clearly delineated world that law suggests. In the
quest for legitimacy, the panels (as well as the AB in some
instances, both within and outside the scope of the SPS
Agreement) may have overlooked this complexity. There is a
mismatch between law and science, a mismatch in which the
former maintains a vision of the latter that is pure, seemingly
229. See, e.g., Lukasz Gruszczynski, Science in the Process of Risk Regulation under the
WTO Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, 7 GER. L.J. 371, 396 (2006).
230. DSU, supra note 9, art. 19.2.

2011]

LAW TALK V. SCIENCE TALK

199

able to affirmatively determine social conflicts on an objective
basis. It is a view that is far removed from any contemporary
understanding within the field of science itself. As Robin
Feldman puts it: “the problem is not only that science cannot do
for law what we think it can, the problem is also that science is
not even what we think it is.”231 Science is, however, “the best
way to understand the way the world works” by “explaining
physical, chemical, and biological processes” albeit with
remaining “areas of ignorance.”232
Leaving aside the question of the divergence between the
territorially bound power of any legal system and the claim to
universality that is inherent in science, some argue that
“[r]egulatory decision-making cannot do without, but must not
exclusively rely on, expertise and science.” 233 This has been
identified as a particular problem in multi-level governance
systems and the WTO has been criticized for allowing global
standards to be imposed through its decision-making process.234
The AB recognized this when it found that risk assessment is not
limited to the matters that are “susceptible of quantitative
analysis
by . . . empirical
or
experimental
laboratory
235
methods.”
Following a probabilistic or rational choice approach has
neglected taking into account the richer dimensions of science,
which do not exist independently from the society in which they
operate. While this may be a lamentable state for some, the AB’s
more nuanced approach is responsive to the intricacies and
complexities of scientific discovery and is at least cognizant of
the varying viewpoints over certain risks. Its jurisprudence,
especially in EC–Continued Suspension, points in a direction in
which the results of scientific inquiry play a significant role, but
not to the exclusion of all other factors. The AB recognizes that
science is inherently characterized by uncertainty. This
uncertainty being part of the language and indeed the very
231. FELDMAN, supra note 201, at 95.
232. Lewis Wolpert, What Lawyers Need to Know about Science, in 1 LAW AND
SCIENCE: CURRENT LEGAL ISSUES 289, 289 (Helen Reece ed., 1998).
233. Joerges, supra note 73, at 15; see Howse, supra note 88, at 2341.
234. See JOERGES, supra note 73, at 18–19; Dario Bevilacqua, The Codex Alimentarius
Commission and its Influence on European and National Food Policy, 2006 EUR. FOOD &
FEED L. REV. 3, 13.
235. Appellate Body Report, EC–Hormones, supra note 37, ¶ 187.
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culture of science must have an impact on the policy arena and
ultimately the legal arena as well. As pointed out by others,
“[f]ailure to do so, by insisting on a single estimate of risk
(whether the ‘best’ estimate or otherwise), does not fully and
truthfully describe the state of science at any moment.”236
Uncovering the different assumptions underlying the
jurisprudence of the panels and the AB is therefore an
important task. It was fortunate that the Panel in EC–Continued
Suspension revealed its rationale when it required a “critical
mass” standard for states to rely on when implementing a risk
assessment. At the very least, the panel’s position allows for a
discussion about the assumptions that the participants have
when addressing highly consequential issues by making them
public. 237 The resolution of these differences has real
consequences in a world in which we “live and work and die.”238

236. See Crawford-Brown et al., supra note 13, at 468.
237. See Hudec, supra note 1, at 86–87.
238. Appellate Body Report, EC–Hormones, supra note 37, ¶ 187.

